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ABSTRACT 
 
It is generally recognized that the environment merits protection even in times of war. In 
spite the fact that it even merits protection for its own sake, International Humanitarian 
Law is only concerned with the anthropocentric basis of the environmental protection. 
History has shown that the provisions that are supposed to directly protect the environment 
have failed to do so. Because protection that exists today leaves much to be desired, the 
aim of this thesis is to identify the basic principles of IHL and apply them to the protection 
of the environment. The case of Fallujah is used as an example that tells the story on how 
the conduct of war scars the fragile environment when certain means and methods of 
warfare are used. In this analysis, it seems that the long-term effects on the environment 
may not be included in the assessment of collateral damage. Because the global 
environmental ecosystems are interacting, such damage may very well affect us all. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In April 2004, in Fallujah, the US Army started Operation Vigilant Resolve following the 
killing of four American private security specialists.1 Later that year, on 8th of November, 
US forces (together with the UK forces) launched Operation Phantom Fury, also known as 
Al Fajr.2 Fallujah was a city completely controlled by insurgents whose number the US 
forces estimated to be between 5000 and 6000.3 Fallujah was seen as the epicenter of the 
Iraqi insurgency and was US top priority in a broader campaign of their security strategy.4 
Between 50 000 and 60 000 civilians were believed to still remain in the city when the 
attack was launched.5 The city was said to be completely in ruins after the attacks.6 The last 
year’s reports about the rise in birth defects and cancer among the population7 and the 
symptoms that American soldiers who came home after serving in Iraq showed8, triggered 
the allegations suggesting that the US forces had used weapons that potentially could have 
contributed to the seriousness of the today’s situation. 
                                                
1 Garamone, Jim, ”Coallition working to Pacify Fallujah, Destroy Sadr Militia”, 
American Forces Press Service April 8 2004 : http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=26905 
See also ”The High-Contracting Business”, Private Warriors, Frontline, PBS: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.html 
2 Garamone, Jim, ”Iraqi, U.S. Troops Begin 'Al Fajr' Operation in Fallujah”, American Forces Press Service 
November 8 2004: http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=24900 
3 Ibid. 
4 Karon, Tony, ”The Grim Calculations of Retaking Fallujah”, Time Magazine, November 8 2004: 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,768590,00.html 
5 Ibid. 
See also Monbiot, George, ”Behind the phosphorus clouds are war crimes within war crimes”, The Guardian, 
November 22 2005: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/22/usa.iraq1 
6 Ali Fadhil, Guardian Films for Channel Four news, ”Fallujah-the real story”, 2005,  
See also ”City of Ghosts”, by Ali Fadhil, The Guardian, January 11 2005: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jan/11/iraq.features11  
7 Cockburn, Patric, ”Toxic Legacy of US assault on Fallujah worse then Hiroshima”, The Independent, July 
24 2010: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/toxic-legacy-of-us-assault-on-fallujah-worse-than-
hiroshima-2034065.html  
8 ”We track soldiers´sickness”, New York Daily News, September 29 2004: 
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/track-soldiers-sickness-article-1.568815 
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/small-victory-ailing-g-i-s-article-1.550397 
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1.1 Purpose 
 
On the basis of these attacks in Fallujah, my aim is to identify the potential effects on the 
environment due to the means and methods used in Fallujah by US forces. It can certainly 
be so that the means and methods used in Fallujah have been used in other places of armed 
conflict. However, the usage has not necessarily been in the same way. The primary aim is 
to explore what environmental effects are conceived with the way these means and 
methods were specifically used in Fallujah. 
Due to given allegations of this case and many uncertainties that are still 
overshadowing the factual background, my aim is to come a step closer to the possible 
legal outcome if the actions that allegedly occurred where not in conformity with the 
principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). If the attacks on Fallujah could 
presumably be linked to the effects on the environment and human health in that area over 
the last decade, how would that comply with IHL? Are the means and methods chosen and 
the way they were used in Fallujah within the framework of IHL? If not, has their use 
provoked damage/injury that is disproportionate or/and militarily unnecessary for the 
military advantage anticipated?9  
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The research for this thesis was conducted in order to find out whether the usage of certain 
means and methods of warfare, such as weapons containing white phosphorus (WP), and 
the way they were used in Fallujah, is contrary to the principles of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). 
First, it is important to identify the principles of IHL and in what international 
conventions they can be found. I have also looked at whether the certain principle is 
                                                
9 For the sake of this paper, damage and injury are used synonymously.  
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perceived as customary rule of IHL. This part of the research, used throughout the thesis, is 
the traditional legal method, analyzing the existing and accepted sources of law in order to 
find out what the given rule is and how to fill out the interpretation of its text where 
necessary.10  
Second, the traditional legal method also incorporates the different case law that was 
examined to analyze how the given rules, important for my case, were used and interpreted. 
The existing jurisprudence was then compared to the facts in my case for the sake of 
conceiving the possible outcome if the rules were to be interpreted in the same manner as 
given jurisprudence.  
Third, the weapons and munitions containing WP demand an understanding and 
interpretation of the scientific information available. Therefore, I have collected data from 
different research agencies and interviewed scientists and research analysts in order to 
better understand the scientific information and create better conditions for optimal 
applications of the scientific findings to the legal principles of IHL. 
 
1.3 Structure 
 
The second chapter of this thesis is a short historical introduction to emergence of the 
protection of the environment and its molding into the form as we recognize it today. In 
chapter three, I have assessed how the notion of environment is understood in the legal 
discourse of IHL and what environmental damage might be perceived as. 
Despite the fact that some legal protection exist for the environment in the area of 
humanitarian law, armed conflicts of last decade show that this protection is not sufficient 
enough to really make a difference.11 The provisions of Art 35(3) and Art 55 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) set a very high threshold for environmental 
damage to be met. Given the likelihood that the effects on the environment from the attack 
                                                
10 Lomio, Spang-Hanssen and Wilson, ”Legal Research Methods in a Modern World: A Coursebook, Djof 
Publishing 2011, page 233 and 235. 
11 Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict, An inventory and Analysis of International Law, 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 2009, page 4. 
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in Fallujah would not reach that threshold of these two provisions for a number of reasons, 
this area of law might not help us in concluding the legality of the attack. In chapter four, I 
will assess why Art 35(3) and Art 55, directly protecting the environment, seem not able to 
assist us in analyzing environmental damages in Fallujah. 
There are also other rules that could be helpful for protection of the environment in 
law related to armed conflict. Although it has a different threshold test, the Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (ENMOD) deals with environmental modification techniques that might be 
beneficial where ENMOD can be applied. Unfortunately, the characteristics of the events 
in Fallujah is not likely to be something considered to fall within the definition of 
modification techniques where only conventional weapons have been used. 
Notwithstanding that there may well be harm that has been caused to the environment 
and environmental harm that indirectly affects the civilian population, there are other 
mechanisms within IHL that we may have to rely on in order to challenge the legality of 
the actions in Fallujah. These mechanisms would be the rules of military necessity, 
principle of distinction, proportionality principle and the meaning of military advantage. 
The interplay between these rules may help in properly addressing the consequences of 
both environmental damage and environmental damage that affects the civilian population 
that these events in Fallujah gave rise to. In order to answer the question whether the usage 
of chosen means and methods (such as weapon MK 77 and other munitions containing 
white phosphorus) were excessive and/or unnecessary, we need to raise questions about the 
relationship between military advantage and military necessity. 
In chapter five, I will explain the meaning of the basic principles of IHL and analyze 
the relationship between the military necessity and military advantage in order to shed 
some light on whether what occurred in Fallujah and the damage that was created was 
excessive and/or unnecessary within the meaning of IHL. The chapter also incorporates 
Marten Clause and the principle of humanity that problematizes the issue of dealing with 
the balance between what is humanely acceptable and militarily necessary. The prohibition 
on indiscriminate attacks and precautionary measures are applicable when environment is 
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being targeted, therefore, I will address them in order to shed some more light on the 
possible environmental protection that they might provide. 
The chapter six will deal with Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and how this Convention might also help us in 
determining the legality of the damage caused to civilians and the environment. The 
Convention incorporates the cardinal principles of IHL and complements them with 
explicit prohibition on certain conventional weapons. It is also how the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction (CWC) functions which will be explained and compared to the 
facts in Fallujah in chapter seven. Finally, the thesis ends with concluding comments in 
chapter eight. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
The thesis will focus on the legality or illegality of the damages presumably caused to the 
environment and that indirectly had an impact on the lives of civilians, due to the weapons 
that presumably have been used. 
Whilst the aim of the paper isn´t to speculate on the possibilities of individual 
criminal responsibility for those alleged facts, I will raise question about individual 
criminal responsibility in an explanatory manner where this might help understanding the 
complex interaction between different principles of IHL. The aim is, nevertheless, to point 
towards legal questions that have arisen in the aftermaths of the battle in Fallujah. 
I will concentrate my research to two allegations made by various sources following 
the attacks in Fallujah and which continue to be made. These allegations claim that the US 
forces deployed MK 77 against combatants and civilians during the attacks in Fallujah. MK 
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77 contains white phosphorous (WP) that has certain effects on its own.12  Other weapons 
containing WP have also allegedly been deployed against the city. 
I am aware that I am handling mostly allegations when it comes to usage of MK 77 and 
other WP in Fallujah, and that there is very little undisputed facts put to the test. We know 
that the attacks took place and we see that the situation has developed in a certain way. 
Whether this can be linked to that specific attack in Fallujah still remains very uncertain. 
However, I do see a possibility to present my point of view of the attacks and the possible 
results of these attacks in a broader perspective. If these allegations were true, given the 
consequences of the attack, in what way is this in compliance with the law? Because of the 
factual uncertainties surrounding the happenings in Fallujah, I will concern myself with the 
case of Fallujah as if I were to use a fictional scenario. The way the newspaper sources are 
used is to help me in managing the jigsaw puzzle of the alleged scenario. They are, strictly 
speaking, guidelines to better understanding of the possible legal outcome, if the 
allegations were to be accurate. 
There are also certain limitations in scientific uncertainties. The aim is not to 
establish scientific accuracy of the effects and find out whether these facts can be linked to 
the means and methods used in Fallujah. I will concentrate on the legal outcome if the 
linkage were to be established. 
Lastly, due to the limitations of time and space for this paper, I will not put any 
emphasis on explaining the international environmental law and the associated conventions 
for the protection of the environment in peacetime and their possible influence on 
international humanitarian law. 
 
1.5 The alleged facts of the battle in Fallujah 
 
In November 2005 the Italian public television network Rai, broadcasted a controversial 
documentary called “The hidden massacre” by Sigfrido Ranucci and Mauricio Torrealta.13 
                                                
12 International Peace Bureau, Disarmament for development program: http://ipb.org/i/disarmament-and-
development/III-E-01-DADP-ipb-appeal-us-white-phosphorus-use-iraq.html  
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The documentary stated that the insurgence and civilians left in the city witnessed that the 
US forces had used chemicals and poisonous gas during the attacks. This conclusion was 
drawn due to the esthetics of the corpses they saw. Later on, this description, seemingly 
supported by individuals in the US military, explained what happens to human flesh when 
it comes into contact with specific substances from the weapons that contain white 
phosphorus (WP).14 On the Fallujah Coverage site of Rai television network, it can be read 
that the Al- Quds Press who published the allegations had only anonymous sources to rely 
on.15 The US State Department denied that the white phosphorus was used for any other 
then illumination purposes.16 When the March-April issue of “Field Artillery” magazine 
suggested that it was used a bit more offensive, the US officials corrected the information 
admitting that they were used against enemy combatants.17  
As far as Mark-77 (MK 77) is concerned, it is a part of the incendiary bombs family, 
a direct evolution of M-47, the napalm bomb used in Vietnam.18 While the traditional 
napalm consists of a mixture of gasoline and benzene, the MK 77 contains kerosene-based 
jet fuel, a smaller concentration of benzene.19 Therefore, it is referred to as napalm-like 
incendiary weapon. The usage of this weapon in Iraq was first brought to the world’s 
attention when the Herald Correspondent Lindsay Murdoch reported from one of the first 
battles in Iraq suggesting that the napalm-like weapon had been used.20 Another article 
                                                                                                                                               
13 Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24: 
http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/body.asp  
14 ”A Debate: Did the US Military Attack Iraqi Civilians with white phosphorus bombs in violation of the 
Geneva Conventions? Democracynow.org, November 8 2005: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2005/11/8/a_debate_did_the_u_s 
15 ”Did the U.S Use ”Illegal” Weapons In Fallujah”, Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24: 
http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/illegal_weapons.asp 
16 ”US used White Phosphorus in Iraq”, November 16 2005: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4440664.stm 
Popham, Peter, ”US forces used chemical weapons during assault on city of Fallujah”, November 8 2005: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/us-forces-used-chemical-weapons-during-assault-on-
city-of-fallujah-514433.html  
”Did the US Use ”Illegal” Weapons In Fallujah, Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24: 
http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/illegal_weapons.asp 
17 Field Artillery, ”The Fight for Fallujah”, March-April, 2005. 
18 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk77.htm 
19 Ibid. 
20 Murdoch, Lindsay, ”Dead bodies everywhere”, Sydney Morning Herald, March 22 2003: 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/21/1047749944836.html  
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from San Diego Union Tribune alleged the same facts.21 These allegations turned into facts 
when Adam Ingram, UK defense minister of that time posted a letter where he confirmed 
that MK 77 had in fact been used in Iraq.22 Napalm is not prohibited when used against 
military targets but used against civilians it falls under the CCW Protocol III.
                                                
21 Crawley, James W., ”Officials confirm dropping firebombs on Iraq”, San Diego Union-Tribute, August 5 
2003: http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030805-firebombs01.htm  
22 ”US lied to Britain over Use of Napalm in Iraq War”, by Colin Brown, The Independent, June 17 2005: 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0617-01.htm 
”The US used chemical weapons in Iraq and then lied about it”, by Monbiot, George, The Guardian 
November 15 2005: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/nov/15/usa.iraq  
Read the letter here: http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/foto/documento_ministero.jpg  
  9 
 
2 A Short History on Development of Environmental Protection within 
International Humanitarian Law 
 
From the first ban on weapons that cause unnecessary suffering in the 1868 Declaration of 
St Petersburg, IHL has been developing throughout the 20th century, trying to meet and 
cover new emerging needs in the area of war conduct.23 The application of the IHL consists 
today of four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols (AP I and AP II) from 
1977, the second came to include IHL for non-international armed conflict. The purpose of 
the Laws of War is not to completely hinder the damages done to the civilians and civilian 
objects during armed conflicts. It is not possible to absolutely avoid that those not taking 
part in hostilities are spared from any harm. Every armed conflict harvests civilian victims 
and provokes damage to civilian objects. The primary purpose of humanitarian law is to 
“alleviate as much as possible the calamities of war.24 In other words, IHL defines the 
limitations on the use of violence in armed conflicts. 
The “wanton destruction” in times of war has its roots in 1863 provisions of Lieber 
Code but these are in turn inspired by previous writings on the very new emerging concept 
of environmental protection in times of war.25  The importance of environment is by all 
means, not a new statement. Even the ICJ, In the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons 
                                                
23 Greenwood, Christopher (in Fleck), The handbook of International Humanitarian Law, second edition, 
2010, page 23. 
24 Dinstein, Yoram, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, second 
edition, Cambridge University Press 2010, page 5, (Taken from the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 
renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. The same 
Declaration stated that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is 
to weaken the military forces of the enemy”). 
25 Hulme, Karen, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2004, page 3. 
She explains that both Vattel and Locke have written about military tactics that included destroying food 
stocks and being harmful to non-combatants, clearly stating an anthropocentric view but it offered an indirect 
protection for the environment.  
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case, stated that environment should not be looked upon as something abstract but the very 
important part of humanity, including generations to come.26 
Today, there is no doubt that the humans are dependent on the status of their 
surroundings for their survival. The status of the importance of environment has grown 
from 1972 Stockholm Declaration to 1992 Rio Declaration creating implications that global 
environmental responsibility is an erga omnes obligation.27 The nature of attacks of modern 
warfare highly impact upon the environment that can last for decades. It is not surprising 
then that the environment as an indispensable component of the wellbeing of humans is 
targeted in times of armed conflict. Direct and indirect attacks on the environment can form 
a part of a strategy of a military attack. The 20th centuries conflicts have brought the 
question of inclusion of environmental protection into the International Humanitarian Law. 
Geneva Conventions also provide some protection both to the environment for the good of 
humans and environment per se but the threshold seems to be set to high to meet the 
standards required. Toxic air pollution to slightly radioactive agricultural fields and 
drinking water dams affect the people’s possibilities of livelihood and present challenges 
for rebuilding peace. In order to address these issues we need to explain and understand 
what basic principles operate within IHL and indirectly affect the understanding of 
environmental protection in times of war. Some examples that have been discussed 
intensely are forest destruction and loss of wildlife in Vietnam and Iraqi Oil-well fires in 
1991, causing both air and sea pollution. It illustrated the need for serious considerations on 
how to protect the fragile environment. Other examples of importance is chemical warfare 
by Iraq during the 1980ies, the extensive destruction of cattle and farmland following the 
“ethnic cleansing” of Serbian villages in Croatia and NATO attacks on industrial facilities 
in Pancevo releasing poisonous gases effecting the inhabitants and causing death of all 
aquatic life along Danube River.28 
The handling of Agent Orange and other herbicides during Vietnam War that resulted 
in immense degradation of forest and its impact on civilians gave rise to inclusion of Art 
                                                
26 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ 1996, page 241, para 29.  
27 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law & the Environment, third edition, Oxford University Press 
2009, page 131. 
28Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 26, at p. 241, para 29. 
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35(3) and Art 55 API as the States agreed that the environment merited more protection 
than what was previously available.29 The aftermaths of chemical warfare by Iraq on 
Kurdish population resulted in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) 
that was adopted during Paris Conference in 1989. Other convention that can be of 
importance for environmental protection are Biological Weapons Convention from 1972, 
the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
(CCW) and its five Protocols from 1981, with latest amendments in 2001 and the 
Landmines Convention which absolutely prohibits possession or use of anti-personnel 
landmines to which 153 states were party to, on May 2007.30 As history shows, damage 
done to the environment can therefore be intentional or may be the expected result of the 
methods and means chosen.31 Environment usually suffers extensive destruction and 
degradation during armed conflicts and in their aftermaths.32 The rules that are limiting or 
prohibiting certain weapons and methods of warfare are also influencing the impact the 
warfare has on the environment, directly and indirectly.
                                                
29 Hulme, supra n. 25, at Chapter 2 and p. 71. 
30 Greenwood, (in Fleck), supra n. 23, at p. 33. 
31 See for instance in more detail the case study; Iraqi Oil-Well Fires in Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 163. 
32 Bothe, Bruch, Diamond and Jensen, International law protecting the environment during armed conflicts: 
gaps and opportunities”, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 92 Number 879, Cambridge, 
September 2010, page 570.!
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3 The Understanding of the Concept of Environment and Environmental 
Damage 
 
3.1 What is Environment? 
 
According to certain dictionary interpretations, environment incorporates both non-living 
and living environmental elements. Hulme states that there is no single accepted definition 
of the term “environment”, even within environmental law.33 The concept of environment, 
in the legal meaning of International Environmental Law, has been said to incorporate two 
distinct parts: the human environment and the natural environment.34  What has been 
recognized as “natural” environment in treaties protecting the environment, according to 
Hulme is “flora and fauna, air, soil, water, vegetation, habitat, forests, marine living 
resources, ecosystems, organisms, climate and agriculture”.35 The definition included in a 
specific treaty will be specifically adopted for the functions and objectives of that particular 
treaty. The generalization of each term is therefore not recommended as a definition. When 
it comes to interpretation of the environment within the meaning of armed conflicts, 
Security Council has created a definition in the SC Resolution 678 from 1991, for the 
specific purpose of interpreting the environmental damage caused by Iraq to Kuwaiti Oil 
Wells.36 The Resolution included air, soil, water, flora, fauna and the ecosystem formed by 
their interaction.37 Hulme is suggesting that “natural environment” acts upon an organism 
to the extent that it determines that organism´s fate. The biological interdependence, in 
                                                
33 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 12. 
34 Ibid. at p. 18. 
35 Ibid. at p. 12. 
36 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 13. 
37 Ibid. 
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other words, is of fundamental importance with regard to the severity of environmental 
damage.38 This is due to the creation of global mesh of climatic system where the 
ecosystem in one place can affect the ecosystem in another. ICRC´s Commentary offers a 
similar interpretation: 
“The concept of the natural environment should be understood in the widest sense to cover 
the biological environment in which the population is living. It does not consist merely of 
the object indispensable to survival…but also includes forests and other vegetation…as 
well as fauna, flora and other biological or climatic elements”39 
People are also part of the environment and dependent on a healthy environment in which 
to live. The starting point of human environment is, not surprisingly, human beings. It is 
the environment that gives the human “his physical sustenance and affords him the 
opportunity for intellectual, spiritual, moral and social growth”.40 The concept is also based 
on inter-generational equity and the rights of future generations to a healthy environment. 
However, these two concepts are interconnected in the sense that when protecting natural 
environment, one is also protecting people. The two are indivisible.41 
 
3.2 What is Environmental Damage? 
 
The assessment of environmental damage is a complex question. There is no strict legal, 
nor strict scientific concept of what environmental damage is. When it comes to the 
definition of environmental damage, the word “damage” has a criterion of its own. As 
Hulme explains it, a damage, harm or injury requires the causation of some negative impact 
on the environment.42 The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
                                                
38 Ibid.  
39!Koppe, Erik, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment during International 
Armed Conflicts, Hart Publishing 2008, page 156.!
40 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Preamble, para 1. 
41 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 16. 
42 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 23. 
She refers to Oxford English Dictionary when interpreting the word “damage” and the wordings “damage”, 
“harm” and “injury” she uses as synonymous. For the sake of simplifying the meaning of “Damage” in this 
paper, I will use the same wording as synonyms.  
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Resource Activities defined damage to the Antarctic environment as “any impact on the 
living or non-living components of that environment or those ecosystems, including harm 
to atmospheric, marine or terrestrial life”.43 The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
Change has an even broader definition of what constitutes environmental damage that 
includes the effects on socio-economic systems and welfare.44 This implicates that different 
wordings are intended only as definitions for the different purpose of each treaty. This is 
also the base for the meaning of environmental protection, making it predominantly 
anthropocentric. 
The Conventions regulating the laws of armed conflicts are no exceptions as they too 
provide for their own criteria when assessing environmental damage. What we know today 
is that damage can be caused by various different changes in ecosystems and can be strictly 
natural. But they are also caused by human activities, especially when it comes to the 
effects of waging war. The problem is determining what causation is responsible for which 
damage. Hulme suggests that first and foremost scientific determinations of damage are 
generally first made. When this is accomplished, the legal terminology is introduced within 
which the damage is either reduced or prohibited.45 Scientific testing can help in measuring 
the degree of the damage caused to a particular environment or ecosystem by the 
introduction of a specific substance. As the case is in Fallujah, when white phosphorus was 
introduced as a substance used in weapons that were deployed in Fallujah, the scientific 
measuring that would be needed is how much of that specific substance is present in the 
soil, water and air in Fallujah and what are or what would be the negative effects of such 
presence. What the outcome would be of such measurements might not be the subject to 
the same limitations as the legal regulations, on both national and international level. As 
Hulme points out, the definition of environmental damage found in treaty law and in 
domestic regulations will differ from a purely scientific assessment of damage in such way 
that the level of damage required before any legal regulation will be applicable will often 
be far higher than the actual term utilized by the particular treaty or domestic instrument.46 
                                                
43 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra n. 27, at p. 7. 
44 Ibid. at p. 6. 
45 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 17. 
46 Ibid.  
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The various regulations on environmental protection use different kinds of alternative terms 
such as “effects”, “harm”, “damage”, “pollution, and “injury”. They all can be understood 
differently and have different legal outcomes, dependent on where and how they are used. 
This paper will only concern itself with the damage caused to the environment as human 
causation of harm due to the deployment of specific substance through certain means and 
methods of warfare.
  16 
 
4 Direct Protection of the Environment applied to Fallujah case 
 
The provisions in API, Art 35(3) and Art 55(1), in my opinion, seem to have been an 
innovation for the IHL at the time of their adoption. This is of course due to the large-scale 
destruction that took place in the Vietnam Conflict. There was the recognition by state 
parties for the need to at least limit environmental damages during warfare.47 Art 35(3) and 
Art 55 of the AP I offer limitation to the damage done to the environment both when 
environment is a direct target in itself and as a part of collateral damage. 
The principal concern for international humanitarian law are human beings so the 
protection of the environment and the interpretation of the existing rules naturally take an 
anthropocentric point of view, which has been criticized.48 However, the Art 35(3) AP I 
suggests that environment in fact has some value per se. The article reads: 
“It is prohibited to employ methods and means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment” 
This is one of the basic rules of AP I and does not directly refer to the survival of civilians.  
The prohibition is repeated in Art 55(1) AP I but has an additional reference to health and 
survival of the population. The article says: 
“Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods 
                                                
47 Ibid. at p. 71. 
48 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 204. 
For example, it has been stated that the treatment of the environment as a civilian object is too 
anthropocentric. Dinstein here considers that the criticism in fact misses the point. Dinstein explains; “as long 
as it is classified as a civilian object, the natural environment must not be the object of an intentional, direct, 
attack irrespective of the presence of civilians in or around it.” In my opinion, as a civilian object, 
environment seems to merit protection because it has an importance to civilians, not necessarily because it 
has a value per se. One can imagine that there are certain cases where the environment merits protection for 
its own sake. This is where I find that the criticism still makes sense.  
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or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the 
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population” 
The ICRC Commentary explain that the very essence of these two provisions is the concept 
of ecosystem (natural environment as opposed to human environment) which merits 
protection from means and methods of waging war that upset the very balance of the 
natural living and environmental conditions.49 In Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, 
ICJ reaffirmed that Art 35(3) and Art 55 of AP I embody a general obligation to protect the 
natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage. 
Such a protection could be achieved by prohibition of methods and means of warfare, 
which are intended, or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment.50 
The wording of the provisions suggests that the damage is only prohibited above a 
specified threshold of harm. Indeed, to constitute a breach, damage has to be widespread, 
long-term and severe, which means that the damage done must have a cumulative effect 
(my emphasis). Although the terms are not specifically defined in the API, there is a 
general agreement that together, they establish a very high threshold because all three 
requirements need to be met. But because Art 35 lacks the reference to the human injury, it 
entails a lower threshold of harm than Art 55.51 How long-term, widespread and severe the 
damage has to be in order to fit into the meaning of provisions is highly uncertain. There is 
even disagreement whether the oil spills and fires caused by Iraq to Kuwaiti oil wells 
during the 90/91 Gulf War crossed the triple standard requirements in the two provisions.52 
Even though the outcome from those attacks resulted in emissions of several toxic particles 
that gave rise to acid rain and global warming and even though the smoke screen over 
Kuwait caused a ten degrees Celsius drop in temperature resulting in the coldest winter on 
record, there is an uncertainty whether those effects on the environment and harm related to 
them were “significant”.53 At least there is still a debate over the significance of that harm. 
                                                
49 ICRC Commentary to the AP I, page 409, para 1444. 
50 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 26, at p. 242, para 31. 
51 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 72. 
52 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): ”Final report to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, page 7, para 15. http://www.icty.org/sid/10052  
53 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 165. 
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As far as the wording of the provision is concerned, there is some indication that 
states considered the term “widespread” to refer to the area greater than several hundred 
square kilometers.54 The notion of “severe damage to the natural environment” seems to 
refer to the intensity of the resulting environmental damage and it incorporates the 
prejudicial effect of the damage to the civilian population, according to the Hulmes´ 
interpretation of travaux préparatoires.55 If this means that the environment can´t be 
severely damaged unless humans are affected, then the Art 35(3) looses its credibility to be 
protecting the environment for its own value. 
Art 55(1) has a wording that points to the protection designed to guarantee the 
survival or health of human beings. It suggests that if an action is a threat to humans, the 
Art 55 is applicable even if the human survival is not at stake.56 By survival, it is 
understood in terms of both present and future generations. There are opinions that only the 
long-term consequences are intended by the reference to “health”.57 A long-term 
consequence would indicate a standard of very serious harm, which was intended by that 
wording.58 Threat is not just meant for the civilians, the provision explicitly states 
“population”, meaning all humans regardless of their combatant status.59 This would be a 
logical explanation as a “long-term” environmental damage is likely to outlast the war. 
What is certain is that the damage, besides being widespread and severe, has to last 
for a period of decades, twenty or thirty years the minimum, for the provision to be 
effective.60 If the intention is to hold a party responsible for the environmental damage as a 
war crime, the damage is more obvious if the outcome quickly reaches the threshold of the 
provision. But the scenario of responsibility can be much more uncertain as the effects of 
the damage might take time and a full scale destruction become obvious, first after two 
                                                                                                                                               
It is worth mentioning that in the resolution 687 from 91, UN Security Council affirmed Iraq´s responsibility 
under international law for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources in Kuwait.!
54 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 98. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 203.  
57 Tarasofsky, Richard G., Legal Protection of the Environment during International Armed Conflict, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Volume XXIV, 1993, page 51. 
58 Desgagné, Richard, The Prevention of Environmental Damage in Time of Armed Conflict: Proportionality 
and Precautionary Measures, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 3, 2000, page 112. 
59 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 203.   
60 Ibid. at p. 94. 
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decades have passed. When evaluating NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, ICTY Committee 
stated that the notion of “excessive” environmental destruction from the attack is imprecise 
and the actual impact is yet unknown and difficult to measure and therefore ICTY refrains 
from investigating further into the issue.61 Even if one can think that ICTY erred in coming 
to such a conclusion, that a difficulty today should mean not investigating at all, they do 
have a point that the overall environmental harm is too early to tell if one is agreeing with 
the meaning of the notion “widespread and sever”. As Desgagné concluded in his paper, 
ICTY based their evaluation on the notion of criminal responsibility. For this to rise, the 
damage needs to be “clearly” and “manifestly” excessive.62 He argues further that for state 
responsibility to rise, it would be enough for the actions to produce excessive 
environmental damage. It is, however, still very uncertain how this excessiveness is to be 
measured in order to establish state responsibility for environmental damage. For the 
applicability of the provisions in API, the destruction and effects of the damage need to 
clearly indicate that it will last for at least two decades. If it does not make such an 
indication then there is nothing else to do then to wait for time to tell if the damage will 
come to fit into the wordings of the provision. If the damage reaches the triple requirement, 
the damage is considered to be in breach of the two articles, as it would be regarded as 
excessive. A part from the requirements in the provisions of the articles, the damage needs 
also to be committed willfully and been foreseeable result of an attack. Hulme considers 
also the wording of the two provisions as intentional (with a purpose to cause) or expected 
damage of the means and methods chosen (it was not the purpose but it is known that such 
damage will occur). Summing up the wording, the needed mens rea would be intent or a 
foreseeable result of such damage.63  
In our case, it has been about eight years since the battle in Fallujah. Even though we 
can see certain evolvement of the effects on the civilian population, it is highly uncertain 
whether these effects can be expected to last two decades or more. It is also highly 
uncertain that these effects can be linked to the usage of conventional weapons in the first 
place without proper scientific evaluation. For such reason, there is a high uncertainty that 
                                                
61 Final Report, ICTY, supra n. 52, at p. 23. 
62 Desgagné, supra n. 58, at p. 117. 
63 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 74. 
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these provisions could be applied in our case. The city of Fallujah is said to measure 30 
square kilometers that does not fulfill what is required for widespread damage.64 Even if 
the Art 35(3) can be found under the chapter on means and methods of warfare, it is very 
doubtful that such a threshold can place any constrains on the use of conventional means 
and methods of warfare.65  In fact, with such a high threshold, it is doubtful that the  
provisions offer any significant protection, except in most serious cases. Bothe explains 
that the major flaw of the two provisions, interpreting the qualifying wordings, is the fact 
that they are written in an era reflecting considerations for protecting the environment at 
that specific time in history. Today the needs look different and the wordings are being 
“more and more considered inappropriate.66 
To this day, the environmental damage that fulfills all three requirements of these two 
provisions, hasn´t been acknowledged and we can conclude that it is highly doubtful that 
the case of Fallujah would be the first to meet the applicable standards for these two 
provisions. We can only turn towards the basic principles of international humanitarian law 
in order to find some guidance in qualifications of environmental damage caused in 
Fallujah and possible establishment of its excessiveness.
                                                
64 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/fallujah.htm  
65 Desgagné, supra n. 58, at p. 113. 
66 Bothe, Michael, The Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, German Yearbook of 
International Law, Volume 34, 1991, page 57. 
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5 The Principles of IHL and their applicability on the Environment 
 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules that are designed to regulate the 
combat of war in international and non-international armed conflicts. In Public 
International Law, IHL is regarded as lex specialis as it is concerned with this specific 
situation of armed conflict. Sometimes, it is referred to as The Law of Armed Conflict. 
This body of law regulates the treatment of the individual, both civilians and military, in 
times of armed conflict. It also regulates the treatment of civilian object and military 
objective. It does so determining restrictions to the use of force against the enemy. These 
restrictions of Jus in Bello involve how the war is conducted, what means are chosen and 
what methods are best suited for the conduct of war to achieve the military purpose desired. 
 
5.1 The Doctrine of Military Necessity 
 
Military necessity can be explained as a necessity to achieve the very purpose of a specific 
attack, such as the submission of the enemy that will give the military forces definite 
military advantage. Military necessity means what needs to be done in order to achieve a 
specific military purpose. It implies identification of certain realistic measures in the course 
of action that will accomplish the desired military purpose in most efficient way.67  
Military necessity is also interpreted strictly as an exception where “military necessity 
exempts a measure from certain specific rules of international humanitarian law prescribing 
contrary action to the extent that the measure is required for the attainment of a military 
                                                
67 Hayashi, Nobuo, ”Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International 
Criminal Law”, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 28:39, 2010, page 44. 
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purpose and otherwise in conformity with that law”.68 The rules that prohibit a certain 
action do so independent of military necessity if the rule does not explicitly state that 
exception due to military necessity is allowed. For instance, the IHL prohibits direct attacks 
against civilians and civilian objects. Such attacks are prohibited at all times and no 
military necessity can allow for any exception from that rule. On the other hand, when 
destruction of a civilian object is necessary to achieve a military purpose, the object could 
be considered to change into being military objective. In the Hostage Case, judge Carter 
remarked: 
 
“The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law”69 
 
This is just another way of saying that military necessity needs to be established in order to 
make destruction of property lawful. Such necessity needs to be proven inevitable in order 
for its destruction to be justified. The word “imperatively” is taken from Hague Convention 
IV, Art 23(g).70 What it exactly implies is uncertain, especially when words such as 
“urgent”, “absolute” or  “unavoidable” have been used as synonyms.71 However, we can 
understand that it is some sort of justification for the damage done. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention expresses the same prohibition in Art 53 but here the destruction refers only to 
the Occupying power, other belligerents are not mentioned. The provision of Hague 
Convention still remains valid for the destruction not carried out by the Occupying power 
and can be used in a much more broader sense.72 
It is important to point out that Hague Convention codifies the laws and customs of 
war more as guidelines to the military. The Fourth Geneva Conventions’ primary aim is 
                                                
68 Ibid. at p. 59. 
69 Hostage case (USA v. List et al.) American Military Tribunal Nuremberg, 1948, passage 1253 
http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/Hostage%20Case090901mit%20deckblatt.pdf  
70 It says; ”It is especially forbidden...to destroy or seize the enemy´s property, unless such a destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.!
71Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 7. 
72 ICRC, 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols and their Commentaries; Convention IV Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Part IV: Execution of the 
Convention #Section II: Final Provisions, Article 154-relation with the Hague Convention. 
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first and foremost the protection of civilians. Hague Convention is considered the written 
embodiment of customary international law.73 Whatever the meaning of the word 
“imperatively”, it gives a clear understanding that destruction just for the sake of it, in 
certain cases, can hold the military party liable for the violation of IHL. It gives us an idea 
that there is a difference between civilized and uncivilized way to wage war and IHL points 
out the limits, which are not to be crossed. Criminal liability for the destruction of the 
enemy´s property is stated in Art 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Rome Statute and has a reference to 
the word ”imperatively” in its travaux préparatoires but was then replaced by “military 
necessity”.74 As far as the Rome Statute is concerned, no other destruction of property but 
the “enemy´s property” includes the reference to the military necessity. 
When the military necessity is established, in order to proceed further in the planning 
of the military action, military forces need to know how to make a distinction between 
objects that are prohibited to target directly and objects that are considered to be military 
objectives. 
 
5.2 Principle of Distinction 
 
A rule of paramount importance in Jus in Bello is the principle of distinction between 
military objectives and civilian objects. Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva 
Convention Art 48 states; 
 
“in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian population 
and civilian and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives” 
 
                                                
73 Ibid. 
74 Dörmann Knut, ”Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Sources and Commentary”, Art 8(2)(b)(xiii), page 249. 
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The objects in wartime are either civilian objects or military objectives. In order to respect 
the provision of IHL that only military objectives can be attacked we need to know how to 
make such a distinction. Art 52(2) AP I sheds some light on the issue stating that military 
objectives are limited to those objectives, “which by their nature, purpose, location or use 
make an effective contribution to the military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization offer a definite military advantage” (my emphasis). Military 
objectives refer particularly to armed forces personnel of the adversary (apart from when 
they are hors de combat),75 military transports, buildings used for military purposes but 
they can even be commercial objectives that contribute to military action, such as industrial 
plants.76 Apart from this, there is no specific list on what constitutes a military objective 
and it is mostly up to the commander’s discretion to interpret and decide. The clause, even 
though having tremendous importance is just formulated in general terms.77 Even when 
assessing cases from latest decade, we can find the generalization of this norm.78 
The status of an object in wartime depends on the context in those particular 
circumstances and can change during the course of events. Even an object that is normally 
considered to be civilian object can become military objective if the object, by its use or 
purpose, would make an effective contribution to the definite military advantage. Professor 
Dinstein gave the example of a church that would normally be protected as it makes part of 
the civilian object but if the church, during the time of the attack, becomes a hiding place 
for the adversary party, than the church becomes a lawful military objective.79 In the same 
sense are civilians not protected if they are present in buildings that constitute a lawful 
military objective. For the sake of protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, 
an attack is legitimate only when directed towards a military objective. If the object is not 
considered to be a military objective then the object is considered civilian and protected 
                                                
75 Referring to those ”out of combat”, i.e. wounded and sick or prisoners of war.  
See Kolb and Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflict, Hart Publishing 2008, page 
15. 
76 Oeter, (in Fleck), supra n. 23, at p. 181. 
77 Bothe, Michael, Legal Restrains on Targeting: Protection of Civilian Population and the Changing Faces of 
Modern Conflicts, Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 2002, page 39. 
78 Prosecutor v. Blaski!, Judgment of 2000, ICTY Trial Chamber, para 180, it is stated that ”Civilian property 
covers any property that could not be legitimately considered a military objective”. Unfortunately the 
Chamber did not elaborate further on what is legitimately considered to be a military objective. !
79 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 98. 
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under international humanitarian law. An attack that is directed at civilians or civilian 
objects constitutes an unlawful attack.80 
The principle of distinction is a norm of customary international law and it is 
applicable in both international and internal armed conflicts.81 This general principle of 
IHL is also applicable to the natural environment.82 Even in this aspect, the environment is 
seen as part of customary international law and supported by states military manuals.83 
Natural environment may not be attacked unless it is a military objective and whose 
destruction is imperatively required by military necessity. 
It is possible to imagine that environment in itself could constitute a military 
objective if it by its use, purpose or location becomes the only way to gain definite military 
advantage.84 A certain military action might be necessary to achieve the military advantage 
desired. For instance, during Vietnam War the forest was targeted as a military objective 
and it was broken down so that the enemies would be more exposed in their hiding places. 
This required usage of herbicides that had disastrous consequences for the environment. 
The environment is still recovering from the aftermaths of that degradation. 
Another provision in Art 54 AP I contains a prohibition on attacking, destroying or 
rending useless “objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” 
and there is a high risk to leave the civilian population without adequate food and water “as 
to cause its starvation or force movement”. This prohibition appears also as Rule 54 in 
ICRC Customary rules and is explained to be of a customary character.85 However, this 
prohibition is not absolute. As already mentioned, civilian object can in certain 
circumstances become military objectives and this is also applicable to objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, if and for such time the object 
                                                
80 Art 51(2) AP I states: ”The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack” see also Art 52(1). 
81 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, ICRC, 2005, 
page 25. 
82 Ibid. at Rule 43, p. 144. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Art 52(2) AP I. 
85 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 81, at Rule 54, p. 189. 
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offers direct support or sustains solely armed forces.86 But if destruction of such object 
would result in starvation of the population, the attack against such an object is prohibited 
regardless of the support to the enemy forces, given starvation as a method of warfare is 
prohibited.87 Equally, natural resources, cattle, agricultural fields and drinking water dams 
could very much be referred to as objects of such a basic importance that they become 
indispensable to the human survival and fall under the meaning of Art 54 AP I.88 
The qualification of an object as military objective usually requires a link to the 
military action and to the circumstances ruling at the time. According to the provisions of 
IHL, military objective needs to make effective contribution to military action. Further, the 
total or partial destruction of such an objective needs to offer a definite military advantage. 
In other words, one could argue that there is no point in destroying an object if it really 
does not fulfill a military purpose for the adversary. There simply could not be any 
advantage gained from the destruction. 
In our case, the city of Fallujah could contain several military targets whose partial or 
entire destruction would give the US forces desired military advantage, such as submission 
of the enemy. This would mean that the US forces need to evaluate which objects in the 
city would contribute to the overall purpose of the attack in order to make them lawful 
targets. It could also be argued that Fallujah as a city creates a military objective per se. If 
the insurgents are scattered over the entire city area and hide in various buildings and the 
circumstances at that time are such that its destruction is unavoidable to fulfill the military 
purpose, according to the provision of IHL, Fallujah might be considered a lawful target. It 
could be argued that the entire city could lawfully become military objective if it is the only 
way to neutralize the enemy. The other scenario is that Fallujah as a city is destroyed 
because lawful military objectives within the city were targeted and such targeting resulted 
in the complete destruction of the city. Of course, both scenarios would require that other 
equally important provisions of IHL protecting civilians and civilian objects have been 
assessed and are not breached. Under such circumstances where no other provisions of IHL 
                                                
86 Art 54(3)(a) and (b). 
87 Art 54(1). 
See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 81, at Rule 53. 
88 UNEP, 2009, supra n. 11, at p. 17. 
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have been breached, the civilian casualties and damage to the civilian objects, as well as 
environment, become collateral damage. 
Nothing in the facts about this case suggests that environment was targeted directly 
as a military objective. What the facts suggest is that the US forces were interested in 
capturing and/or disabling the terrorist leader al-Zarqawi and about 6000 insurgents that 
were accompanying him. This could make for two individual military objectives, the 
capturing of a leader and disabling his troops. But it could also be treated as a single 
military objective as the leader and his insurgents usually operate side by side. When the 
insurgents establish hiding places in one or several buildings, the buildings are than 
targeted as military objectives. Nevertheless, such targeting would require that other 
equally important provisions of IHL protecting civilians and civilian objects have been 
assessed and are not breached. Under such circumstances where no other provisions of IHL 
have been breached, the civilian casualties and damage to the civilian objects, as well as 
environment, could constitute collateral damage. 
 
5.3 The understanding of Collateral Damage 
 
Civilians and civilian objects are protected under the wordings of IHL from being directly 
attacked. However, the damage or injury to the civilians and civilian objects can very well 
be unavoidable and incidental casualties as a result of a lawful attack. The damage that is 
not purposely caused but occurs as a result of the attack is called collateral damage. It is 
incidental. And it is lawful if the overall military attack is lawful. 
Military necessity, proportionality assessment and military advantage go hand in 
hand. What military advantage is seeking to achieve is crucial in deciding upon what can 
constitute a military objective.89 The military advantage can be explained as being tied to 
the qualification of the military objective in those particular circumstances prevailing at the 
time. If there is no military advantage gained from destruction of a particular object then it 
                                                
89 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), Commentary on Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Harvard University 2009, Section A: Military Advantage. 
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cannot be considered as a military objective. Further on, what is necessary to do to fulfill a 
military purpose needs to be in proportion with the damage that the attack is expected to 
cause during the military operation. When it comes to environment and collateral damage, 
as it is with all other civilian objects, the harm caused to the environment must not be 
excessive in relation to the military purpose. Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons case, 
ICJ explains: 
 
“States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is 
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objective. Respect for the 
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity 
with the principles of necessity and proportionality”90 
 
What ICJ is suggesting is that the environment needs to be taken into account when 
calculating collateral damage. When a military objective is under attack, the environment 
should already be included in the calculation of the excessive damage v. definite military 
advantage. In their review of the NATO bombing campaign, even the ICTY Committee 
stated that the “military objectives should not be targeted if the attack is likely to cause 
collateral environmental damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct military 
advantage which the attack is expected to produce”.91 How this could be achieved is up to 
every military force to decide respecting the given provisions on laws of war. 
The principle of proportionality is part of customary international law and equally 
applicable in relation to the environment.92 It is there to balance what is necessary damage 
in a military action and what is humanly acceptable.93 Here, the advantage anticipated is 
weight against the level of losses and damage done to the civilian objects. This status 
makes military advantage central to the proportionality assessment. Even though civilian 
lives will be lost during the military attack, it is legally acceptable if this loss is in 
                                                
90 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 26, at p. 30. 
91 Final Report, ICTY, supra n. 52, at p 8, para 18. 
92 Holland, Joseph ”Military objectives and collateral damage: Their relationship and dynamics, Yearbook of 
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proportion to the expected military advantage.94 The same can be applied to the 
environmental damage assessment. If the destruction of a cornfield (which by all means 
can be seen as indispensable to the human survival as it is expected to provide food for the 
inhabitants) is necessary for a military force to gain military advantage, the destruction can 
be justified on the basis of military necessity. However, if the destruction of a cornfield is 
necessary to gain just one battle (the rest of the events are, tentatively, very uncertain) and 
the destruction affects survival of 300 000 inhabitants then the military necessity 
assessment becomes more difficult. The advantage gained from the attack needs to be 
weight against the expected damage/injury it may create. This is the basic concept of 
collateral damage. According to the Art 54(2), objects that are indispensable to the human 
survival are not to be attacked unless they are directly supporting enemy operations and its 
destruction is a military necessity.95 However, if this destruction would result in possible 
starvation of the civilian population or force the civilian population to move, the 
destruction is prohibited.96 
In other words, if the environmental damage is a foreseeable result of a lawful attack, 
it is referred to as collateral damage. Environmental damage here encompasses both 
environment per se and environment as a part of a civilian object. Collateral damage has to 
be in proportion with the military advantage anticipated and needs not to be excessive. 
When the damage is excessive the attack becomes unlawful even if it is directed towards a 
military objective. 
 
 
 
                                                
94 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 26, Dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins, para 20.!
95 See Svensk manual i humanitär rätt m.m (Swedish Manual of Humanitarian Law) SOU 2010:72, Bilaga 7, 
341, page 72. 
See also Joint Service Publication (JSP 383): THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, UK, 2004 Edition, 5.19, page 65. 
96 Art 54(3) and (4). 
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5.4 Military Advantage 
 
When military forces are about to launch an attack, the military objective chosen for that 
attack, with its total or partial destruction, needs to offer definite military advantage, with 
or without collateral damage. 
The definition of military advantage can be understood as an advantage from one 
specific attack, an advantage from one artillery round in one specific attack or advantage 
from the whole operation, the specific attack being just one part of the operation. The 
definition of an attack in Art 49(1) API seems to point to an isolated event as the notion is 
linked to the military objective.97 It could be understood as assessment of “one attack at the 
time” and each attack must fulfill the requirement for military advantage. The lawful 
military objective is chosen because it gives a desired military advantage at that specific 
point in time and therefore the needed advantage from that attack would constitute one 
specific event. But this interpretation is also understood as too narrow and several countries 
have expressed different opinion towards the meaning of military advantage and made 
reservations to the API.98 In accordance with the view of some states, Fleck also explains 
that military advantage is “advantage which can be expected from an attack as a whole and 
not only from isolated or specific parts of the attack”.99 In the UK Joint Service Publication 
of the Law of Armed Conflict (UK JSP), it has even been said that military advantage does 
not need to be immediate in order to count as military advantage.100 Countries like 
Australia, New Zeeland and USA have also stated that according to their view, military 
advantage also “includes the security of attacking forces.101 Further on, when several states 
are combining a military operation, such as NATO strikes, the military advantage “may 
                                                
97 Oeter, (in Fleck), supra n. 23, at p 185. 
The Art 49(1) defines “attacks” as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defense”. 
98 Joint Service Publication (UK JSP 383): THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, UK, 2004 Edition, page 56. 
99 Oeter, (in Fleck), supra n. 23, at p 185.  
100 UK JSP 383, supra n. 98, at p 56.!
101 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p 93. 
Meaning that military objectives may constitute objects not traditionally seen as military objectives if they are 
important for the security of the enemy. 
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accrue to the benefit of an allied country or the coalition in general”.102 It could be argued 
that this perhaps is to go to far in the interpretation of the military advantage but, 
nevertheless, such point of view seems to exist among the states. 
My understanding of what allegedly happened in Fallujah derives from material that 
not necessarily provides the most certain factual analysis. In the light of this material I will 
need to make a number of presumptions for the purpose of identifying what constitutes 
military advantage in this particular case that I am concerned with. For the purpose of this 
paper and because the factual evidence to rely upon is insufficient, I will not concern 
myself with military advantage as per each individual attack. Instead, I will approach a 
matter as a battle in Fallujah, an entire operation whose surrender would have an effect on 
the continuation of the further operation in Iraq. If we were to apply this notion to Fallujah, 
than the attack on Fallujah could be seen as an attack whose military advantage may be 
linked to the Iraqi war as a whole. It would be a separate action within the ultimate 
operation and the definite military advantage of that attack would mirror the definite 
military advantage, strategically important in further evolution of military operations. In 
my opinion, definite military advantage is perhaps the advantage that takes the military 
forces at least one step closer to the fulfillment of the very purpose of waging war and 
therefore it has to be seen in the light of this purpose and not just as an independent and 
isolated event. According to some alleged facts, Fallujah was seen as the epicenter of the 
Iraqi insurgency and such a case would create an idea that the attack to neutralize the 
enemy may be considered to give the desired military advantage to the US forces, not only 
in Fallujah but perhaps to the Iraqi operation as a whole. Would this mean that the military 
advantage in such a case would not be restricted only to the attack on Fallujah but would 
apply to the overall contribution to the entire Iraqi operation? 
Relying on proportionality on the basis of these two adjectives describing military 
advantage is not to be seen as an easy task. What is “concrete” and “direct” in an objective 
assessment of military advantage of a commander in charge? Perhaps a better 
understanding of the relationship between military advantage and proportionality principle 
offers a further insight. 
                                                
102 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p 93.  
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5.4.1 Military Advantage in relation to Proportionality 
 
Finding the balance between military considerations and the principle of humanity is 
probably one of the hardest tasks when planning a battle and when decisions are taken 
during a battle.103 The question of what constitutes military advantage at that particular 
assessment of the situation is perhaps equally important as what constitutes excessive loss 
of lives and damage to the civilian objects. This requires that those who are in charge of 
planning a battle inform themselves as much as possible, or at least as much as it is feasible 
to expect from them to obtain information necessary in order to make the right decision.104  
The embodiment of the proportionality principle is found in Art 51(5)(b) AP I:  
 
“An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”105 
 
The word “definite” (that is found in Art 52(2)) has been explained in the UK JSP as 
“concrete and perceptible military advantage rather then a hypothetical and speculative 
one”.106 However, if there is collateral damage involved, or at least if it is obvious that 
civilians or civilian objects (or a combination thereof) will be in danger of being harmed, 
the military advantage needs to be “concrete” and “direct” in order to justify such harm. In 
other words, the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated needs to be in 
proportion to the collateral damage it is expected to cause. The adjectives “concrete” and 
“direct” in Art 51(5)(b) might be a higher requirement to fulfill than the adjective 
“definite” as in definite military advantage as Holland finds in his argumentation.107 But, as 
pointed by UK JSP, there is a tendency to use the word “concrete” when analyzing military 
objectives for the “definite” military advantage and when comparing the amount of 
                                                
103 Gasser, (in Fleck), supra n. 23, at p 249. 
104 Art 57 2(a)(i) AP I. 
105 See also the same wording of precautionary rules in Art 57(2)(a)(iii) and Art 57(2)(b). 
106 UK JSP 383, supra n. 98, at p 56. 
107 Holland, supra n. 92, at p. 52 and p. 53. 
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collateral damage to the “concrete” military advantage. This of course might be one way of 
simplifying the task of assessment for those planning the attack, using the same criteria for 
assessment of military advantage for both military objectives and collateral damage. 
Which value is more important, human lives or the definite military advantage? As 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Holland finds, “collateral civilian losses are often concrete, dramatic 
and emotive….the contrasting value, military advantage is usually very abstract”.108 
Perhaps, this is why the media chose to project the picture of a complete destruction of 
Fallujah rather than praise the successful US military operation, according to the US 
forces.109 There is indeed little emotional impact from military advantage. Yet, it can be 
justified over human lives.110 
Lieutenant-Colonel Holland points out the relationship between military objectives 
and proportionality and their common term “military advantage”.111 He finds; “the more 
military advantage associated with an object the more collateral damage is legally 
permissible in an attack”.112 From this the logical conclusion is that the higher the collateral 
damage, the higher the demand of military advantage from the attack. This is also the 
opinion of ICTY Committee that recognized the importance of the target in relation to the 
incidental damage expected: “if the target is sufficiently important, a greater degree of risk 
to the environment may be justified”.113 How big or important military advantage is, in 
those particular circumstances, will effect the amount of damage accepted for that specific 
advantage. Anticipation of such importance is what makes the damage accepted. As stated 
in HPCR Commentary: “the actual results of an attack are irrelevant to the reasonableness 
of the assessment of the military advantage at the time when the attack was planned or 
                                                
108 Holland, supra n. 92, at p. 47. 
109 Field Artillery, supra n. 16, at p. 46. 
 See also ”US forces used 'chemical weapon' in Iraq”, 16th of November 2005: 
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111 Holland, supra n. 92, at p. 52. 
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executed”.114 Accordingly, if there is no military advantage to be gained from the attack 
there could be no civilian losses because any civilian loss equated to no military advantage 
would, in the light of IHL principles, constitute a disproportionate damage.  
 
5.4.2 Military Advantage in relation to Military Necessity 
 
Considering the possible factual scenarios from the battle in Fallujah, one could ask what 
kind of military advantage could be gained from the partial or complete destruction of that 
city? Or in other words, what kind of military advantage is necessary for the overall 
purpose of the military attack? In the Hostage Case, judge Carter stated: 
 
“Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount 
and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of time, life, and money. In general, it sanctions measures by an occupant 
necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations. It 
permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is 
incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of 
armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent 
inhabitants of purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill.”115 
 
What it refers to is that a military force may use all means necessary (and for that time 
being available) to bring the enemy to surrender as long as the action really is necessary to 
fulfill the mission. In my opinion, this incorporates the term “military advantage”.  The 
advantage sought is necessary because it will help a commander reach the goal of 
submission of the enemy “at the earliest possible moment with the least possible 
expenditure of men and resources”.116 For such reason, the advantage is a necessity for 
                                                
114 HPCR, supra n. 89, at Section A: Military Advantage, p. 2. 
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116 Neuman, Noam, Applying the rule of Proportionality: Forge protection and cumulative assessment in 
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reaching that ultimate goal. Ensuring submission of the enemy means, not only the usage of 
cheapest means possible, but also assessing the possible exposure to the risks to 
commanders own soldiers. Naturally, fewer soldiers to fight can mean risk of not gaining 
military advantage in future battles.117 
The statement of judge Carter can be criticized of being to permissive and implying 
that any necessity is permissible if it will result in a military advantage.118 Of course, this 
would be to imply that even the prohibited actions in a war are to be considered permissible 
if they result in a military advantage. This is, however, not the case. The actions that are 
absolutely prohibited under IHL, such as direct attacks on civilian objects, etc. will never 
be justified under the doctrine of military necessity. Military necessity and military 
advantage need to be in compliance with the rules of engagement at all times. 
Military advantage may be seen as a necessity to win the battle in the short run and to 
win the war in the long run. In other words, the advantage that a belligerent seeks must be 
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the belligerents´ actions, whichever of the two 
possibilities it might be. The advantage sought must be necessary for the purpose of wining 
the war. The purpose here can be either a purpose for which the military advantage is 
sought or the purpose can be military advantage in itself. If the damage is unavoidable 
because the purpose of destruction is a military necessity, then the damage can also be seen 
in proportion to that necessity. 
Perhaps it would be illogical to consider an attack that has no military necessity 
provide a military advantage in the light of IHL provisions.  It is perhaps a question for 
discussion whether an unnecessary attack could result in a military advantage. Indeed, it 
could be military advantageous to kill the adversary for preventive reasons even if 
necessity wasn´t the case at that time. However, the legality of that action would perhaps be 
questioned on the bases of necessity and not on the basis of advantage as the discussion 
was in Hostage case. 
In the Fallujah case, if the purpose of this attack was in fact to win the war in Iraq, 
then military advantage anticipated must include the calculation of the “concrete and 
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direct” possibility to win Iraqi war. It must show a tangible possibility or even probability 
that such an attack on Fallujah could result in winning the Iraqi war. However, nothing in 
the circumstances ruling at that time suggested that with the neutralization of the enemy in 
Fallujah, the US forces could celebrate their victory and return home. On the contrary, 
according to the circumstances ruling at the time, along with other uncertainties circulating 
around the given reasons for this attack to happen in the first place, it was not even certain 
whether the terrorist leader, whose capture was of paramount importance according to the 
US forces, was residing in Fallujah at the time of the attack.119 An attack on Fallujah would 
be military advantageous when enemy has been neutralized because such a neutralization 
of the enemy may have a desired effect at that specific time and place under the ruling 
circumstances. Whether that effect would echo positively on the further development of 
Iraqi war would be highly speculative. In my opinion, the possible concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated following the attack on Fallujah is the neutralization of the 
enemy in Fallujah at the circumstances ruling at the time. For such reason, an attack on 
Fallujah is a military necessity to achieve military advantage anticipated. 
The way I understand the relationship between military necessity and military 
advantage is that the military advantage is an inherent part of military necessity in the way 
that any necessary attack is also military advantageous otherwise there would not be a need 
to undertake that act unless there were any advantage resulting from it. Indeed, disabling 
the enemy is axiomatically advantageous. In such case, military advantage has already been 
included in the considerations of military necessity. What creates military necessity is 
usually the very purpose of the military action. This does not mean that all means and 
methods are allowed in order to achieve that purpose. As stated earlier, international 
humanitarian law defines the limitations on the use of violence in armed conflicts in certain 
situations and prohibits them in others. Whether the unavoidable destruction of the entire 
city to neutralize the enemy is in proportion to that advantage is perhaps the next question 
to be answered. For that reason, it seems reasonable to explain further the meaning of 
military necessity in order to understand better the advantage sought and the damage it may 
create. 
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5.4.3 Military Necessity in relation to Proportionality 
 
An attack that creates incidental damage to its surroundings, may it be civilians or civilian 
objects, that is in proportion to the military advantage anticipated can be a lawful attack in 
the light of IHL provisions. Excessive collateral damage is one of those important limits 
where the damage needs to be in proportion to the purpose of launching the attack. In cases 
where the incidental damage created by an attack is not in proportion with the military 
advantage sought, the damage is said to be excessive which makes the attack unnecessary 
and unlawful. Hayashi treats military necessity by breaking it down into four requirements 
where all four requirements need to be fulfilled for the necessity to really state a military 
necessity. Provided that the purpose sought to be achieved (like military advantage) and the 
measure chosen for achieving that purpose (an attack) is in conformity with international 
humanitarian law, the measure needs to be taken for some specific military purpose and the 
attack needs to be required for the attainment of the military purpose. If this is not the case, 
then the measure taken is “militarily unnecessary”.120 This would suggest that if the 
measure chosen creates a damage that is considered disproportionate to the purpose, it 
would mean that the damage is not in accordance with IHL. In that case and according to 
Hayashis´ findings, such disproportionate damage would make the claiming of military 
necessity void. 
When it comes to collateral damage, Hayashi explains that “proportionality weights 
the injury that the measure would cause to protected persons, objects and interests vis-à-vis 
the value of the military purpose that the measure would achieve”.121 Supposing that a 
lawful military objective is under attack, the proportionality principle offers evaluation of 
collateral damage v. military purpose of that attack. If the damage is proportionate for the 
military purpose sought, the attack constitutes a lawful attack. If the damage is 
disproportionate to the military purpose sought then the attack is unlawful even if military 
necessity could be claimed to exist. On the other hand, unnecessary attacks are unlawful, 
no matter what the proportionality assessment might conclude. In the end, all four subjects 
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must be in accordance with the provisions of IHL, otherwise the military necessity cannot 
be established and rendered void. In the same sense, if an attack is found to be militarily 
unnecessary than there are good reasons to claim that it also becomes unlawful. Perhaps my 
point of view on what military necessity ought to be is too idealistic compared to the 
realities of war. But I would like to believe that just because it is hard to obtain a situation 
where all parts of the attack are militarily necessary (as it is a question of proof and what 
information was available at the time) doesn´t mean that it should not be strived for. In the 
same sense, just because it is highly doubtful that any assessment of the military operation 
planning done by a commander would be a completely objective assessment, it does not 
mean that objectivity is not worth to be included in the provisions of IHL. 
In my point of view, military necessity and proportionality are interconnected in such 
a manner that military necessity dictates the amount of proportion of injury accepted for the 
purpose to the extent that the higher the importance of purpose sought, the higher is the 
acceptance of the amount of collateral damage. It is so until the injury falls over the line, 
becomes excessive and dismisses the claim of military necessity. One can be of the view 
that necessity has nothing to do with the proportionality as far as it concerns the amount of 
injury expected. It has to do with the principle of humanity. What is humanly acceptable in 
a situation that claims collateral damage is what creates proportion. I do agree with the part 
where humanity appeals to us as humans not to commit acts that can be avoided. The way I 
see it, what is humanly acceptable is also what is militarily necessary otherwise we would 
not be in the situation where we need to assess proportionality. Because, in my view, when 
the attack is launched, the proportion of injury the attack creates also becomes necessary 
for the purpose to be achieved. 
However, the establishment that an attack constitutes an unlawful attack does not 
automatically mean criminal liability for that attack. Art 85(3) points that a grave breach of 
the Protocol is at hand when the act is committed willfully, in violation of the relevant 
provisions and in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects (my emphasis). In Blaski! Judgment, ICTY Trial 
Chamber commentary explanation is that the destruction unjustified by military necessity, 
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to constitute a grave breach, it must be “extensive”, “unlawful” and “wanton”.122 As 
pointed out by Trial Chamber, each situation merits its own evaluation when it comes to 
evaluating extensiveness. Even a single act can be enough to constitute a grave breach of 
Geneva Conventions if the expected loss of lives and expected damages to civilian objects 
is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. Dinstein is arguing that this 
confusion between “extensive” and “excessive”, also committed by ICRC Commentary, 
needs to be clarified on the basis that even the extensive collateral damage need not to be 
excessive in light of the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.123 
In my view, there are four subjects that can be assessed from the meaning of military 
necessity when planning a military operation: 
- Military advantage (purpose of that operation) – a necessity in accordance with IHL 
- Military objective (target of that operation) – a necessity in accordance with IHL 
- Means (measure of that operation) – a necessity in accordance with IHL 
- Collateral damage (injury resulting from that operation) – in proportion to a 
necessity in accordance with IHL 
If the purpose is to disable the enemy from future battles and the enemy is hiding in various 
buildings in the city, as the case is with Fallujah, then the US army chooses the city as a 
military objective. Suppose that this is a lawful decision, that such an objective renders the 
attack lawful, we can say that attacking Fallujah is a military necessity because disabling 
enemy from future battles is a military necessity. If such an advantage cannot be achieved 
by targeting the entire city then there is no military necessity emerging from that attack. 
Further, it would not be enough to make just these two assessments to make the attack 
lawful. What measures the US army chooses for obtaining the advantage sought must also 
be a military necessity. Here, it can be said that the choice of weapons has to be in 
accordance with the achievement of that purpose, nothing more nothing less. If it is less 
than required for the achievement of the purpose, the purpose would not be achieved and 
no military advantage can be obtained. Such an attack would be unnecessary because the 
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injury created by that attack would not be in proportion to the advantage anticipated.124 On 
the other hand, if the weapon chosen is more than required for the destruction then the 
attack may create injury that is not in proportion to the purpose sought and will be 
unnecessary for that reason. If the army chooses a weapon that will achieve the purpose of 
the attack but that creates injury that is disproportionate to the attack then such an attack 
would be militarily unnecessary. 
Even if it is hard to reflect over the need to consider between the collateral damage 
and the military advantage, there is indeed some element of equation in the assessment of 
disproportionality. The case of Fallujah is no exception. What we have at hand is the fact 
that about 60 000 civilians were left in the city and US force had allegedly targeted two 
military objectives (or just considered them as one) that would give them military 
advantage anticipated. The first assessment is that between the first military objective, the 
terrorist leader weight against 60 000 civilians. The second assessment is between the 6000 
insurgents weight against 60 000 civilians. 
Based on previous suggestions, when it comes to means and methods chosen for the 
attack, the principle of necessity offers evaluation if those in charge of planning and 
executing attack have done everything in their power to verify that the attack being 
launched really is necessary. One question could be; is there any other way to gain same 
military advantage with less collateral damage? If there is, does the law require that such 
measure be chosen? 
 
 
 
                                                
124 For the sake of clarification of this statement I would like to point to the fact that if a commander chooses 
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5.4.4 Precautionary measures as a part of Military Necessity Assessment 
 
The precautionary measures can be found in two provisions of AP I. Art 57 states 
precautions in attacks, and Art 58 precautions against the effects of attacks. It has been said 
that its purpose is twofold.125 It ensures the respect for the identification of the already 
mentioned principles of distinction and proportionality but also contains autonomous 
obligation to minimize adverse effects on civilians. For instance, those who plan the attack 
must pay attention to Art 57(2)(a)(i) of AP I and do everything feasible to make sure that 
objectives chosen for the attack really are military objectives within the meaning provided 
in Art 52 AP I. They must also be certain that the military advantage anticipated really is 
definite. Art 57(2)(ii) AP I is concerned with evaluation of different choices of means and 
methods that are offered to those who plan a military operation. It states: 
 
“Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall…take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with the view to avoiding, and in any event 
minimizing, incidental loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects” 
 
The provision includes the evaluation of which weapons are being used, their range and 
overall effect as well as the time and place chosen for that specific attack.126 To be legally 
bound by precautionary measures means to ensure that the choice of weapons and 
ammunition used in an attack do not cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injuries 
to both civilians and military staff. It means that all other effects not intended but can be 
avoided, should be avoided. In that case, it can be said that precautionary principle also 
creates an obligation to minimize collateral damage.127 What the word “feasible” implies is 
that all circumstances, practically possible at the actual time, need to be taken into 
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See also Borrman, Robin, The use of depleted uranium ammunition under contemporary international law: is 
there a need for a treaty-based ban on DU weapons?, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, Vol. 26, No. 4, 
October-December 2010, page 273. 
126 ICRC Commentary, supra n. 49, at p. 680, para 2200. 
127 McDonald, Kleffner and Toebes, supra n. 125, at p. 151. 
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consideration, including humanitarian as well as military considerations.128 The feasible 
precautions to avoid, or at least minimize incidental damage to the environment is included 
in this principle.129 Military commanders can thus be said to have an obligation to select 
type of weapons and method of deploying those weapons that are best suited for the attack, 
of course, together with assessing expected effects on civilian lives and objects. As ICRC 
Commentary remarks “when a well-placed 500 kg projectile is sufficient to render a 
military objective useless, there is no reason to use a 10 ton bomb or a series of projectiles 
aimed without sufficient precision”.130 Such a case would be militarily unnecessary and the 
damage would be disproportionate to the overall goal. But we can also imagine situations 
where even a 500 kg projectile deployed in an urban area creates damage that could be seen 
as excessive in comparison with the purpose to be achieved. In such a case, would the 
choice of a 500 kg bomb, being the lesser of two evils, mean that it is a lawful choice 
because there still exists a military necessity for the purpose to be achieved? According to 
Hayashi, even if the measure chosen is the least injurious of all alternatives that are 
reasonably available and materially relevant to the purpose, the military necessity is still 
inadmissible if the result is disproportionate for the purpose sought.131 Such a case would 
require the commander to abort military operation. 
There is also another provision in Art 57(3) AP I that illustrates the question of 
choice: 
 
“When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar 
military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be 
expected to cause least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects” 
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An attack can have concrete and direct military advantage and create collateral damage that 
is in proportion to that advantage at the same time where another solution was available 
offering the same military advantage but with less collateral damage. If there is another 
choice with less collateral damage, then the attack that creates more collateral damage can 
be assumed to be unnecessary. To choose such an attack may perhaps constitute a breach of 
IHL because precautionary measures clearly state, that the attack with less collateral 
damage, in such case, needs to be chosen. If one comes to a conclusion that there was no 
military necessity because another less severe solution was possible then there is no need to 
discuss proportionality because the attack is proclaimed unlawful already on the basis of no 
military necessity. This still requires that the means and methods chosen do not breach 
other principles of IHL. The evaluation of what kind of choices were at hand in that 
particular situation can be easier to objectively evaluate than to objectively evaluate if 
civilian casualties from the chosen attack really were excessive. It can be more obvious if it 
can be established that there were other means and methods at a commander’s disposal to 
choose from to accomplish same definite military advantage. 
The task of a military commander includes the successful execution of a military 
mission as well as compliance with the laws of armed conflict. Commanders are very 
seldom also humanitarian lawyers, nor should that be expected of them. The way they 
assess what is necessary to target to achieve military advantage perhaps differs from what a 
humanitarian lawyer would find, assessing the same situation. Especially when the 
commander includes the risk to his own soldiers in the assessment of military necessity and 
advantage and IHL does not offer any provisions dealing with this specific issue.132 There 
is no obligation for commanders to expose their forces to greater danger in order to limit 
civilian casualties.133 In fact, ICTY in NATO bombing case made a statement where it was 
concluded that there was “nothing inherently unlawful about flying at such heights in order 
to avoid attack by enemy air defenses“ even though it made it much more difficult to 
distinguish between military and civilians on the ground and there was only one person 
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making up the military crew in a F16134. Indeed, military necessity would suggest that it is 
in order to fly at such a high altitude in order to avoid being targeted by adversary. If such a 
choice is justified by military necessity and collateral damage created was in proportion 
with the advantage anticipated then I might also agree with the conclusion of ICTY. But in 
this case before ICTY, the refugee convoy of over thousand civilians (majority of women, 
children and elderly) on Djakovica road, was targeted resulting in around 70-75 killed and 
around 100 wounded.135 There are clear indications that point to the insufficient 
precautions taken in this attack, including the fact that NATO did not have sufficient 
information in order to make the correct decision that resulted in civilian losses. Even if 
there were reports that Serb military did use civilian vehicles, the difference between 
civilians and military personnel could not have been spotted from the height NATO chose 
to maintain. 
The purpose of IHL is to protect the civilians and in case of a doubt whether an 
object is civilian or military, the object shall be considered civilian.136 In case such a 
difference cannot be spotted then the attack stands no chance in being launched on a 
specific military objective. If the military forces were intermixed with civilians, as the case 
was on Djakovica road, and the civilians outnumbered the military then the assessment of 
precautionary measures would show that launching an attack under those circumstances 
might be excessive to the military advantage anticipated (the destruction of Serb military). 
Later in Gali! case, ICTY Trial chamber explained that determination of proportionality 
depends on “whether a reasonably well-informed person…making reasonable use of the 
information available to him/her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result 
from the attack”.137 The civilian casualties might have been avoided or at least minimized if 
NATO selected a lower altitude for the operation. The precautionary measures clearly 
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states that if another choice was available then the lesser of two evils should have be 
chosen, provided that it does not create disproportionate results. After all, isn´t the risk of 
being killed in a combat an inherent part of what it means to be a soldier? Or is this risk 
presented to the soldiers suddenly above and beyond the risk assessment of civilian 
casualties?138 Even though in different context, the Gali! case can serve as an example 
where it is concluded that it is not the real number of casualties in comparison to the 
military casualties that make an attack disproportionate. It is on the basis of the fact that 
under certain circumstances, an attack on a crowd of around thousand people can be 
expected to cause injuries to civilians that clearly outweighs the military advantage 
anticipated.139 It is this expectation of the result, not the result per se that makes attack 
disproportionate. It is in my opinion pure luck that NATO operation didn´t result in more 
civilian casualties. The fact that it didn´t does not make the attack less unlawful. The 
NATO attack on Djakovica road was found not to “display the degree of recklessness in 
failing to take precautionary measures which would sustain criminal charges” while the 
attack in Gali! case was declared unlawful by majority of the trial chamber.140 Even if the 
civilians weren’t intentionally attacked in NATO case, in my opinion, what ICTY failed to 
assess in NATO case, it did assess in Gali! case presenting inconsistences in their legal 
approach of the two similar situations. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict the exact impact of an attack. There is no crystal 
ball to rely on. We can just assume that those in charge possess that kind of expertise to 
spot a situation where civilian casualties clearly outweigh military gains. Even though 
commanders have great margin of discretion assessing that risks, they do have the 
obligation to ensure that the military operation complies with the duty to take precautionary 
approach as stated in Art 57 of AP I.141 Because of their duty as commanders, the 
presumption can be made that those who are in charge of planning and making decisions in 
                                                
138  Prosecutor v. Erdemovi!, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 1997, para 19.  
Although Erdemovi! case was about duress, it contains a notion suggesting that being a soldier may indeed 
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a battle have taken military necessity into consideration before going further with engaging 
into military action. It is easier to spot a difference between the meaning of bombardment 
of a military building stating military necessity and the bombardment of a Red Cross 
medical unit stating military necessity.142 The middle road is something of a grey area. 
Especially when it is overshadowed by the difficulties presented in the assessment of what 
constitutes a military objective, all the way to the assessment of necessity and 
proportionality. 
 
5.5 Martens Clause – Principle of Humanity and the Environment 
 
Another underlying ground to the principle of precaution of paramount importance is to 
spare civilians from unnecessary suffering.143 This is also another reason why there are 
limitations to means and methods to wage war. Because this notion in the law is generic, it 
can be referred to both civilians as well as combatants. Perhaps, it would not make sense to 
state that the damage that is prohibited to cause against combatants would be seen as 
perfectly legal to be caused to civilians. What is considered to be inhumane treatment of 
combatants cannot be anything but inhumane treatment of civilians. 
The law cannot regulate every detail in a war or in a combat. Where there is no 
specific prohibition in written law or where the laws´ customary qualification is uncertain, 
Martens Clause can be invoked. Martens Clause refers to “the principles of humanity” and 
“the dictates of public conscience”.144 It is a moral principle of conduct of war. It can be 
found in the preamble of Hague Convention IV and reads: 
 
                                                
142 The belligerents have an obligation to respect objects protected by the Geneva Conventions and if 
intentionally attacked, it may constitute a war crime under the ICC Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiv).!
143 (1907) Hague Convention IV, Art 23(e).!
144 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 9.  
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“Until a more complete code of laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties, 
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rules of the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usage established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience” 
 
The Clause is also introduced in the Art 1(2) AP I. Certain conduct can still be prohibited 
even if it´s not explicitly prohibited by law. Such a case would be if the conduct were not 
compatible with the principle of humanity.145 The Martens Clause is basically there to fill 
in the gaps of IHL. It is important especially when means and methods of waging war are 
constantly developing and where new technology and science are being introduced. Some 
have suggested that it is regrettable that it is not invoked as often as it could and should.146 
Nevertheless it continues to be important as affirmed in Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons case.147 
The expansion of Martens Clause to include environmental considerations is not 
impossible, as it has been suggested by the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUNC).148 They further find that the Clause gives IHL a dynamic dimension not limited by 
time and fundamental principles beyond written law. In today’s context of environmental 
concerns and climate change issues, environment has become a part of the “dictates of 
public conscience”.149 This can include some protection to the environment if, by 
environmental destruction, civilians would be submitted to unnecessary suffering. The 
limitations of “unnecessary suffering” can be said to also apply to the environment.150 
Indeed, why should unnecessary suffering only refer to human beings? The entire 
ecosystem can suffer from means and methods of warfare under specific circumstances. 
Giving this much importance to the natural environment in times of armed conflicts could 
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perhaps be considered provocative to some scholars and military personnel but one could 
also be provoked by the idea that unnecessary suffering is something imperatively reserved 
for human kind and excludes everything else. 
W.D. Verwey proposes that “the dictates of public conscience” “should be 
interpreted so as to include the requirement of avoiding (at least unnecessary) damage to 
the environment, by reference to today´s widespread awareness and concern through 
society.151 Environmental protection during armed conflicts includes only a few principles 
and is in process of constant development. The Clause can serve to fill in even those gaps. 
It invites States to apply international minimum standard from principles of international 
law such as the duty to prevent environmental harm and the precautionary measures. If 
modern weaponry development and new military strategies pose a new emerging threat to 
the natural environment, the Clause can serve to address this rapid evolution of military 
technology. In such way, it invites States to adjust their conduct during hostilities to ensure 
human survival against the environmental consequences of destructive human activities.152 
However, the Clause as an independent source of law is not considered as a proper 
interpretation and binding by all States. For example, USA considers it to apply only to 
help interpreting existing international law.153 
 
5.6 ”Measuring” Excessiveness – is there a way? 
 
Basically, when the military necessity is established, in a battle ordeal, one could argue that 
there is very little that could not be justified on the basis of military necessity to fulfill the 
mission of the military advantage, if that advantage is of fundamental importance. But, as I 
have concluded earlier, even with military necessity established, there can still exist attacks 
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that result in damage excessive for the military advantage anticipated. Such a case would 
be if the commander didn´t calculate the risks accordingly. This outcome would constitute 
an unlawful attack in the meaning of IHL provisions. 
How do we measure excessiveness then?  Are the impacts of destruction measured 
for a day or month to come? Or in other words, when is the loss of civilian lives due to the 
destruction of environment disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated? There is 
no obvious answer to this question. Just as there is no quantitative measurement for the 
collateral damage based on objective evaluation in calculation of military advantage.154 
In the Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ explained that it could not conclude whether it would be 
legal or illegal to use nuclear weapons by a State where its survival as a state would be at 
stake.155 This opens up for the possibility that even the usage of nuclear weapons can be 
justified on the basis of military necessity, if for instance, a mere existence of a state is 
threatened.156 The possible disastrous effects of nuclear weapons have been established by 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII. It is not hard to imagine that if any 
means and methods of waging war could create disproportionate damage that would be 
nuclear weapons. Even in this case the question could be asked whether the complete 
destruction of the two cities was, in fact, in proportion to the military advantage 
anticipated, the capitulation of Japan. 
Professor Dinstein points out that the view that collateral damage applies “only when 
the disproportion is unbearably large” it to go too far.157  On the other hand, excessive 
collateral damage is not any collateral damage. He gives also example of a situation where 
there would be an obvious breach of the principle of proportionality. He states that the 
destruction of a whole village, with hundreds of civilian casualties, in order to eliminate a 
single enemy sniper would be such an obvious breach.158 The question is if the damage 
caused in Fallujah has been excessive to the military advantage anticipated? If it is in fact a 
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matter of destruction of entire city for capturing one terrorist leader then Professor 
Dinsteins evaluation of the equation one person against 60 000 possible losses of civilian 
lives makes the expected damage excessive. But is the equation 6000 insurgents against 60 
000 possible civilian losses a damage excessive? 
For criminal liability, according to the ICTY, it is necessary that the damage done 
“have been perpetrated intentionally or have been the foreseeable consequence of the acts 
of the accused”.159 In other words, if the damage is committed willfully or in the 
knowledge that the attack will cause excessive loss, it is a grave breach of the AP I that also 
implies criminal liability.160 This is of course a question of proof. Did the commander 
launch the attack in the knowledge of that the damage would be excessive or did he count 
on less damage? If the latter, should the commander have known that the damage would be 
excessive? 
As Professor Hampson points out, the “judgments of a commander balancing military 
necessity is rarely, if ever, subject to legal challenge, let alone criminal sanction”.161 This 
might be the result of the fact that military commanders cannot rely on the lex scripta to tell 
them what exact degree of collateral damage is prohibited. They are at the mercy of their 
own mind to find a balance between goals and values on the battlefield. Even though 
military necessity should not be used to justify excessive collateral damage, the objectivity 
(or perhaps even subjectivity) of a commander is given a high profile.162 This means that 
with military necessity established, collateral damage is then assumed to be legal until 
proven to be excessive. Military actions with no military necessity do not create collateral 
damage. They are simply unlawful under IHL. 
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5.7 Indiscriminate attacks 
 
Indiscriminate attacks are stated in Art 51(4) AP I and target attacks that are not directed at 
a specific military objective or employ methods or means of combat that cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective. For example, to fire blindly without a clear idea of the 
nature of the target would constitute an indiscriminate attack.163 They also include those 
means or methods of combat whose effects cannot be limited as required by API. These 
attacks are of such nature that they strike military objectives and civilians or civilian 
objects without distinction (my emphasis).164 Such attacks can be conducted during nights, 
in bad weather or extreme heights, where the vision would be too limited to safely target 
military objectives. 
From the point of view of IHL, indiscriminate attacks are no better then those directly 
pointed against civilians and civilian objects (which are absolutely prohibited according to 
Art 51 and 52 API) as civilian injuries, in both situations, really are not a matter of concern 
to the attacker.165 One can say that, when executing indiscriminate attacks, the attacker is 
indifferent to the damage the attack is causing to civilians and civilian objects. According 
to ICRC Commentary, an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, are also 
part of the notion of what constitutes an indiscriminate attack.166 An attack that is launched 
indiscriminately and destroys civilian objects, such as the MK 77 bomb, deployed by air 
would be an attack without military necessity.167 
In the provisions of Art 51(4) AP I there is no reference that the attack must create 
certain results for the attack to be seen as unlawful. The attack is unlawful when it fulfills 
the wording of the article as indiscriminate attack, with or without certain effects. In Kordi! 
case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that no particular results were needed for the attack 
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to constitute a breach but results of injuries to civilians and civilian objects were necessary 
for the act to constitute a grave breach. ICTY Appeals Chamber explains further: 
 
“Punishment of an unlawful attack on civilians or civilian objects itself, regardless of the 
result, would be based on the concrete endangerment of civilian life and/or property, as the 
perpetrator can no longer control the result of an unlawful attack once launched; thus the 
mere undertaking of such an” in corecto or “in abstracto” extremely dangerous attack 
would be penalized for good reasons”168 
 
One can conclude from this statement that the unlawfulness in the attack lays in the fact 
that the civilian objects were put under the risk of being targeted independently of the 
outcome of that attack. But in order to be prosecuted for the deed on the individual level, 
the risk needs to be turned into a fact. In other words, for the attack to constitute a grave 
breach of AP I, it needs to be committed willfully, but also in the knowledge of that such 
an attack will cause excessive loss of life or damage to civilian objects.169 The prohibition 
against indiscriminate attacks can be said to indirectly provide a protection for the 
environment when the environment makes part of civilian object. In analogy with the 
findings of ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kordi! case, it can be said that there is no grave 
breach of this provision unless the attack produces the results of the excessive damage to 
the environment as part of civilian object. 
Art 51(5)(a) AP I is especially interesting for Fallujah case if one is accepting the fact 
that Fallujah might have been considered as a lawful military objective per se because 
lawful military objectives were scattered throughout the city. The article states that an 
indiscriminate attack is also “an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which 
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military 
objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing similar concentration of 
civilians or civilian objects”. Considering the already mentioned possibility that Fallujah 
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was treated as a single military objective, the issue arises whether the means and methods 
chosen make such an attack lawful. According to the meaning of this provision, an attack 
on the city by bombardment would constitute an unlawful attack considering the equation 
of civilians against the number of insurgents. 
The decision to employ indiscriminate weapons or attacks is usually a result from 
failure to apply previous provision of AP I such as to take necessary precautions before and 
during the attack by failure to seek precise information on the objects to be attacked. In the 
case of Fallujah, the methods of deployment of munitions containing WP seemed to be 
done indiscriminately breaching one of the cardinal provisions of IHL. Even with the 
purpose to neutralize or disable the enemy, the collateral damage WP produced seems to 
have been in disproportion to the military advantage anticipated when the attack was 
delivered indiscriminately. Such an attack produces excessive damage and it cannot be 
justified on the basis of military necessity. The fact that weapons containing WP were used 
indiscriminately, including the MK 77 bomb delivered by air, the conclusion is that the 
damage inflicted on Fallujah was excessive and militarily unnecessary. Therefore, it is a 
violation of a cardinal principle in IHL, that of distinction at all times between civilian 
objects and military objectives (my emphasis). According to the Rome Statute, such 
sequence of events is enough to establish the required mens rea for a war crime.170 
 
5.8 Environment and Precautions 
 
The environmental effects as well as effects on human health from certain means and 
methods of warfare and the scientific uncertainty that surrounds the subject, make this 
principle highly important from the environmental point of view. In the customary law 
study of ICRC, Rule 44 indicates that means and methods chosen “must be employed with 
due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment”.171 This is a 
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reflection of Art 35(3). It is also an implication that there may exist “an obligation to 
minimize environmental damage while planning or carrying out military operations”.172 
Professor Lesley Wexler suggests that the precautionary principle shifts the burden of 
proof of harm away from those likely to suffer from it and onto those that can cause harm 
with their actions.173 This would mean that those, whose military forces are engaged in a 
battle, would need to disprove the likelihood of environmental harm and health problems 
before launching attacks. Wexler also suggests that the principle adds an extra layer of 
protection by being an alternative to risk assessment and other frameworks with scientific 
uncertainty and hidden scientific presumptions. Being “better off safe then sorry” adds an 
extra margin of safety from potential environmental and health risks from certain 
weapons.174 This is, of course, a certain observation if those in charge respect the fact that 
scientific uncertainty does not absolve them from taking precautionary measures. There is 
also a disagreement between States whether some principles of environmental law in 
peacetime are applicable during armed conflicts when there is no such reference made in 
the treaties.175 In Nuclear Weapon Case, the emphasis has been made that “international 
law recognizes the importance of the protection of the environment during armed conflicts, 
and they did not limit themselves to the requirement of treaties specifically applicable to 
armed conflict”.176 There are tendencies also from scholars to suggest that applicable 
treaties in peacetime very much are applicable in wartime as long as they do not represent 
inconsistencies with the laws of armed conflicts.177 The principle of prohibition of 
transboundary harm is one of those important principles. This is related to the notion of a 
“third state”, not involved in the armed conflict. The peacetime concept of sovereignty 
governs the inviolability of a states territory. During armed conflicts, the state that is not 
part of the conflict is still protected by the basis of sovereignty and its territory is not to be 
harmed by the effects of armed conflict between other states.178 If precautions are not 
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taken, the environmental pollution caused from war destruction can spread into the neutral 
states territory and cause damage. I will not elaborate further on the notion of peacetime 
treaties during time of war, as it is not the main concern of this paper. However, it is 
important to acknowledge the significance of peacetime instruments that may not be 
automatically extinguished just because some countries decide to wage war against one 
another.179 
The starting point for a military commander assessing precautionary principle means 
that he/she chooses from the weapons arsenal at his/hers disposal.  Perhaps, it would not 
mean that it is commanders´ responsibility to decide whether a certain weapon should or 
should not be deployed because its effects are scientifically uncertain. I would suggest that 
it is a responsibility of the State to inform and update its military leadership when such 
precautionary measures need to be taken due to scientific uncertainty. For example, a 
commander can be informed that weapons with WP ammunition need not to be used in 
urban areas if it can be avoided accomplishing same military advantage with another type 
of munitions. In that case the military commander would know that potential short- as well 
as long-term risk of WP munitions are uncertain and that risk assessment on bases of 
protection of environment and human health needs to be included in the assessment of 
military necessity.
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6 CCW in relation to means and methods used in Fallujah 
 
As already mentioned, the choice of means and methods in warfare are not unlimited and 
as complementary to the IHL principles there are certain convention in this sphere of law 
that also regulate the usage of some weapons and prohibit others. One of these important 
restrictions to means and methods of warfare is CCW. The purpose of the CCW is to ban or 
restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or 
unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately.180 The chapeau 
of this convention makes a reference to Art 35(3) AP I recalling the prohibition of 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment. Of course, this is not a 
possibility in the case of Fallujah as the threshold is too high for the damage to meet these 
requirements. Nonetheless, the CCW also confirms the States´ determination that “in cases 
not covered by this Convention and its annexed Protocols or by other international 
agreements, the civilian population and the combatants shall at all times remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”. Here, 
the Convention is referring to the importance of Martens Clause. 
The protocol of this Convention that is interesting for our case is the Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary weapons, hereafter CCW Protocol III. 
White phosphorus (WP) is used by the military in various types of ammunition and enables 
the army to produce smoke for concealing troop movements. It is also used as help for 
identifying targets due to the WPs illuminating characteristics.181 It is not disputed whether 
the WP has been used in Fallujah. As the state officials confirm, weapons containing white 
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phosphorus have been used in Fallujah. Such weapons are munitions type M110 and M825, 
with point-detonating delay fuzes.182 What is disputed though, is how or in what way these 
munitions have been used and if such usage has breached the principles of IHL. 
Art 1 of CCW Protocol III states: 
 
“Incendiary weapon means any weapon or munitions which is primarily designed to set fire 
to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or 
combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the 
target. (a) Incendiary weapons can take the form of, for example, flame throwers, 
fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary 
substances” 
 
The prohibition does not seem to include munitions used for illumination purposes. In fact, 
CCW Protocol III says that “munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such 
as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signaling systems” are not included in the Protocol III. 
This is the main argument why WP falls out of the Protocol III. Thus, it is not primarily 
designed to set fire on objects or to cause burn injury to persons (my emphasis). 
The interpretation of what an incendiary weapon is, according to the notion of this 
Protocol, perhaps reads too narrow. What the weapon is primarily designed to do, i.e. its 
purpose of use, is not the same thing as what other possibilities of usage are present and 
what effects it may cause. The fact that a weapon is not primarily designed to cause burn 
injury to persons does not mean that it cannot be used in the same way as the weapons 
whose primary design is to cause burn injuries to persons, such as napalm-like bombs. This 
is where WP escapes the Conventions regulation and creates a problem because the 
historical usage of WP has been of dual nature.183 The incendiary effects of WP have been 
both primary when used as weapon and “incidental” when used for illuminating purposes. 
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“Incidental incendiary effects” is another eye-catching phrase in the CCW Protocol 
III. WP is highly flammable substance. It reacts rapidly with oxygen and catches fire easily 
in room temperature.  In fact, there is a risk for spontaneous ignition according to the 
division of NBC-defense at the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI).184 This may 
suggest that “incidental incendiary effect” in the case of WP, is substantially high. One can 
also argue that it is not even logical to suggest that a substance whose primary purpose is to 
kindle can be regarded as potentially having an incidental incendiary effect. The handling 
of WP demands that it is treated as if it were to react with oxygen at any time during the 
process of its handling. The word “incidental” in the Protocol may not mean that WP is not 
burning when used for illuminating purposes. What it means is that the burning effect is not 
used as weapon. 
The problem with the “incidental incendiary effects”, i.e. the secondary effect, of WP 
is created when the surface-launched M825 artillery rounds are deployed in an urban area 
or near an area where the presence of civilian population is apparent. What written 
Memorandum to CCW Delegates suggests is that WP munitions could be used in populated 
areas for their “incidental” incendiary effects “under the guise of being used primarily as an 
obscurant or illuminant”185. When used by Israeli military in Gaza, the M825 rounds spread 
“WP wedges to a radius of about 125 meters (410 feet), burning civilians and setting fire to 
civilian buildings”.186 
Exposure to WP causes thermal and chemical burns, even down to the bone. Because 
it reacts to oxygen, wounds heel very slowly. WP is highly liposoluble and penetrates 
quickly further into the body after it has penetrated into the skin. Once inside the body, 
white phosphorus can cause damage to the heart, liver and kidneys.187 In other words, the 
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exposure may result in multiple organ failure and death with only 10% of body burns.188 If 
the person survives, there is a high probability to get infections because of the slow heeling 
process and WP poisoning when it enters into bloodstream or the bone. In other words, WP 
as a chemical substance has all the perfect ingredients to cause superfluous injury or/and 
unnecessary suffering and it does precisely that. According to the ICRC Commentary, this 
prohibition is one of the “cardinal principles” of IHL.189 The prohibition is complicated by 
the fact that the countries are not agreeing on how a certain weapon becomes included in 
this prohibition. For instance, in the Nuclear Weapons case when the legality of nuclear 
weapons was discussed on the basis of this principle, France and Russia were of the 
opinion that a weapon can only be prohibited “by virtue of this rule if States choose to 
prohibit the weapon by treaty.190 Other States assessed the legality of the effects of nuclear 
weapons “on the basis of the rule itself”.191 
The rule is clear on this point. Incendiary weapons are prohibited for the reasons that 
they cause injury prohibited by the rule. It has been confirmed by US State officials that 
WP has been used as a weapon against Iraqi insurgents.192 The Field Artillery magazine 
article read: “We used it…as a potent psychological weapon against the insurgents in 
trench lines and spider holes when we could not get effects on them with HE (high 
explosive). We fired “shake and bake” missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them 
out and HE to take them out”193 
The WP was used to “flush out” closed spaces causing anyone inside to flee the smoke and 
fire by going outside where they were then attacked by high explosives. This would suggest 
that persons have in fact been directly exposed to WP and, perhaps, that it was used as an 
incendiary weapon. It is a controversial statement since the prohibition to cause 
unnecessary suffering and superfluous injuries includes belligerents as well as civilians. 
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The prohibition can be found in Art 23(e) of Hague Conventions and embodies custom. 
Thus, the lawfulness of these actions by US forces, in this specific scenario can, in fact, be 
questioned. Another issue arises if the usage of WP to “flush out” insurgents also affected 
civilians present in same spaces together with insurgents. Since there were allegedly 60 000 
civilians and 6000 insurgents in the city, there is a high risk that in many such spaces, 
houses and other buildings in the city, civilians might have outnumbered the insurgents. 
Statistics would suggest that such scenario might have been possible in some 
circumstances. The problem that would emerge is the presence of children and old persons. 
Children and elderly are much more sensitive to the toxic elements of WP than fit and 
healthy soldiers.194 Especially children do not survive a high concentration of toxic WP 
vapor due to carbon monoxide poisoning and the depravation of oxygen, something that is 
created when WP smoke grenades are deployed in a closed area.195 
In my opinion, even if the Protocol restricts its inclusion, when directed against 
persons and civilian objects, WP is to be regarded as an incendiary weapon. If the Protocol 
III rejects the inclusion, the prohibition is still applicable on the basis of customary nature 
of the rule prohibiting unnecessary suffering, a suffering which is deemed to happen due to 
the effects of WP, regardless of its original purpose of use. In the Memorandum to CCW 
Delegates, it has been suggested that the revision is required to include the effects-based 
definition of incendiary weapons since the Protocol III has failed to live up to its promise 
of protecting civilians from the effects of incendiary weapons (my emphasis).196 
 
6.1 The legality of MK 77 as allegedly used in Fallujah 
 
Whatever the uncertainty about WP munitions used as incendiary weapon, there is no 
doubt that MK 77 belongs to the incendiary weapon family. It is a napalm-like bomb and 
even if the MK 77 does not have the same composition as napalm, it has very similar 
destructive characteristics. Because the bomb contains polystyrene, it creates a very sticky 
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substance that highly facilitates its spreading. WP can be added to this bomb to cause even 
more difficulty to put out once the object is on fire because it keeps burning until deprived 
of oxygen. The MK 77 is also known as “dumb” bomb, not a precision-guided weapon. As 
it lacks built-in control system, it scatters over a wide area.197 These characteristics suggest 
that the effects of MK 77 cannot be limited as required by IHL, once it has been deployed. 
The indiscriminate nature of this bomb would breach the principle of distinction. The other 
is already mentioned in the notion on unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury. 
As ICRC Commentary points out “incendiary weapons are subject to restrictions on their 
use when the military objective is situated in an inhabited area. In particular, they should 
never be delivered by aircraft in these circumstances”198. Aircraft in fact, delivers the MK 
77 bomb. If the alleged facts were true, that the bomb was dropped over Fallujah where 60 
000 civilians found shelter, such action might be in breach of CCW Protocol III. 
The issue here is that USA has made reservation to this protocol and claims “the right 
to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians 
where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral 
damage than alternative weapons....”.199 This brings us back to the notion of commanders’ 
discretion when planning and executing an attack. The reservation of this kind opens up for 
the possibilities that the incendiary weapons can be used in urban areas whenever the 
military necessity so requires, on the contrary to what CCW Protocol III prescribes.200  
Because the reservation, in fact, is contrary to the wording of AP I, criticism can be raised 
against the reservation. Even if less collateral damage perhaps is possible with the choice of 
this kind of weapon, does this extinguish the prohibition on unnecessary suffering and 
superfluous injury? Does this choice of weapon that would perhaps create less collateral 
damage, under specific circumstances ruling at the time, extinguish the prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks? I would argue that it does not. According to Oeter, this prohibition 
probably constitutes the most important expression of the principle of “limited warfare”. 
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Oeter continues to explain that the principle of distinction is “both greatest consequence of 
and a modification of the fundamental orientation of warfare towards the requirements of 
“military necessity”.201 If we recall the discussion on military necessity, it does not exempt 
from rules that are cardinal norms of IHL, such as prohibition on targeting civilians. In 
cases where the cardinal rules of IHL would be violated, the military necessity cannot be 
invoked. Unnecessary suffering is prohibited whether or not the collateral damage would 
be proportional to the military advantage anticipated. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited 
at all times because they do not distinguish between civilian and military targets. 
Recalling the Art 51(5)(a) AP I but also Rule 13 in ICRC Commentary, the 
bombardment of military objectives located in the city, town, village or other area 
containing similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are prohibited on the basis 
that such attacks are indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are in fact 
disproportionate attacks. Even if less collateral damage would be created by the 
deployment of an incendiary weapon, the collateral damage created would still be 
excessive to the military advantage anticipated on the basis that indiscriminate attacks are 
prohibited. Such an attack would therefore also be a militarily unnecessary attack. Even 
though USA is not party to the AP I, ICRC Commentary suggests, among others, that the 
prohibition is a norm of customary international law and therefore, I would argue, 
applicable to the actions of the US forces.202  
When it comes to environmental damage of these kind of weapons, Art 2(4) CCW 
Protocol III states that “it is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the 
object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to 
cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves 
military objectives”. The military manuals and official statements which consider that an 
area of land may be a military objective if it meets the required conditions also reflect when 
it would be in order to use incendiary weapons against natural environment.203 When it is a 
military necessity for the specific purpose of the attack to make natural environment 
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military objective, natural environment is considered to be military objective. According to 
the principle of proportionality, the destruction of natural environment is not to cross the 
line of excessiveness. In theory, proportionality principle does protect the environment. 
The environment is also protected if, as a military objective, it is situated in the vicinity of 
concentration of civilians, and whose destruction would be in disproportion to the military 
advantage anticipated. In such case, the natural environment is not to be targeted and is 
therefore protected because the damage created might be excessive. 
There could exist a difference in assessment of the excessiveness between the 
environmental damage per se and the damage done to civilians because of the destruction 
of the natural environment. However, we could only speculate in how this difference 
emerges and how to make such an assessment. We do know, in fact, that the higher the 
military advantage anticipated, the higher is the threshold for measuring excessive damage. 
This is applicable to environmental damage as well as civilian casualties. 
In the case of Fallujah, environment was not directly attacked but the effects of the 
usage of weapons containing WP, such as MK 77, and as an incendiary weapon, have had 
an impact on cattle and other farm animals that civilian population rely on as food supply. 
Along with the overall destruction of the city, the important sources of food stocks were 
also destroyed.204 Such objects can be part of what is known as “objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population”. With 60 000 civilians left in the city compared to 
6000 insurgents, the livestock can assumed to be used not solely as sustenance of the 
enemy armed forces, contrary to what is demanded by Art 54(3) in order to legitimize its 
destruction. With such destruction, one could argue that adequate levels of food perhaps 
did not remain for the benefit of the civilian population. Its destruction, even if 
unintentional, endangered the survival of the civilian population. Of course, criticism can 
be raised against my point of view in question of uncertainties whether this kind of 
destruction really endangered the survival of the population. Nevertheless, the deployment 
of MK 77 could render such scenario possible because of the wanton destruction that this 
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type of bomb creates. Whether or not such scenario would emerge after the deployment of 
MK 77 does not extinguish this bombs´ indiscriminate effect when deployed over urban 
area where population density is expected to be high. After all, if we recall the outcome in 
Gali! case, it is the expectations of the result and not the result per se that constitutes a 
disproportionate attack. 
What can be understood is that deploying a dumb bomb over an urban area, which 
may result in an indiscriminate attack and unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury to 
civilians and civilian objects, is a militarily unnecessary attack. In such case, a commander 
is obliged to take all feasible precautions and perhaps choose another method of warfare 
that does not breach the principles of IHL. This would create an obligation to abort the 
attack if MK 77 is about to be used in urban area. Proceeding with an attack that violates 
peremptory norms of IHL has, in my opinion, enough qualifications to constitute an 
unlawful attack.
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7 CWC in relation to means and methods used in Fallujah 
 
The incendiary effects of WP are perhaps not the only concern when it comes to its impact 
on the environment and on civilians. Besides being very unstable when exposed to oxygen, 
the reaction also produces toxic smoke. In fact, when used as a smokescreen munitions by 
Swedish Armed Forces, it is treated as a toxic chemical agent.205 Most smokes caused by 
smokescreen munitions are not hazardous unless there is excessive concentration or 
prolonged exposure to it but high concentrations of smoke generated in closed spaces are 
extremely dangerous. During the simulation of military operations with WP, the soldiers of 
Swedish Armed Forces are equipped with personal protective equipment to avoid being 
affected by pulmonary edema, a consequence that occurs when person is exposed to high 
concentrations of WP smoke.206 Even other military forces are clear about the fact that 
exposure to heavy smoke concentrations for extended periods can result in casualties as 
well as physical and psychological injury and illness.207 The fact that a military force can 
take advantage of its chemical properties raises the question if WP could fall under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
According to Sten-Åke Fredriksson, a research scientist from Swedish Defense 
Research Agency and fellow participant in the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) central analytical database validation group, there is no doubt 
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that WP is, scientifically speaking, a toxic chemical.208 However, legally speaking, is WP 
considered to be a toxic chemical according to the definition of the CWC? 
In the Art II (2) of CWC the definition of toxic chemical is: 
 
“any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans and animals” 
 
The wording of CWC Convention describes chemical weapons as munitions and devices, 
specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of the 
chemicals209 (my emphasis). The primary design of WP is not to be used in this manner. 
The normal and legal use of WP under correct circumstances is as illuminant or obscurant. 
This is one of the arguments against the inclusion of WP in the CWC. Nevertheless, WP 
has proven to be of versatile nature. The main argument of the USA is that WP is classified 
as an incendiary weapon and therefore does not fall under CWC.210 However, there is 
nothing in the provisions of the CWC that states that once classified as a certain sort of 
weapon, it cannot also be classified as a chemical weapon. One classification does not 
exclude the other if the substance in question shows that its effects fit more than one 
classification. The CWC states that all chemicals defined in the Art II (2) are included in 
the scope of the Convention “regardless of their origin or of their method of production, 
and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere”. 
Perhaps this opens up for the possibility to include substances that are not primarily used 
for their toxic abilities. In my opinion, WP can become incendiary weapon if chosen for its 
incendiary characteristics. In the same way, if the usage is chosen for its toxic chemical 
abilities, it can easily become a chemical weapon. 
The usage of WP to “smoke out” the combatants, as allegedly happened in Fallujah, 
may be considered as usage of WP for its toxic properties. However, it is a question of 
proof whether the chemical abilities of WP was the primary purpose for its deployment 
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against the combatants. It can also be suggested that the ability of WP to produce fast and 
strong heat was the main purpose of its usage in Fallujah. The toxic smoke produced was 
just a secondary effect. In this sense, WP would not be prohibited under CWC because its 
“military purposes are not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent 
on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare”.211 
However, I would argue that when WP is chosen because its toxic abilities create an 
agonizing pain that disables the enemy, and perhaps another living creatures along with the 
enemy, it is chosen primarily for its toxic characteristics even if it was not specifically 
designed to cause such harm. Once again, the fact that it wasn´t designed to do so does not 
mean that it cannot do so. In the end, it is not what it is designed to do but what it is chosen 
to be used for that should be the main criteria on how to qualify WP. The qualification for 
the inclusion of WP in the CWC Convention should be based on the chosen usage of this 
substance regardless of the original purpose of its creation. Because of the fact that many 
states are using WP in their military artillery, it seems so that the political resistance against 
the inclusion of WP in the CWC Convention will remain strong. 
 
7.1 Is WP toxic to the Environment? 
 
According to the US Army document, in an artillery projectile, WP wedges ignite 
immediately upon exposure to air and fall to the ground.  Up to 15 percent of the WP 
remains within the charred wedge and can reignite if the felt is crushed and the unburned 
WP is exposed to the atmosphere.212 The Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), in the 
report published in 2000, has addressed this issue. FOI has assessed the environmental 
effects in a long-term perspectives caused by left obscurant ammunition focusing on WP.  
When used as smoke screens, the maximum of 92% of WP oxidizes during combustion, 
and substantial amounts of WP may remain unreacted on the ground.213 They came to a 
conclusion that “small particles of WP are the modification presenting the main hazard to 
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the environment” and “the presence of particulate elemental white phosphorus at Swedish 
artillery ranges must therefore be investigated and the hazard put in relation to the number 
of fired shells and remaining duds”.214 Even if examined on the basis of usage by Swedish 
Armed Forces, this would suggest that similar effects on the environment could be 
expected at other places where significant amount of WP munitions have been used. In 
fact, one of the biggest causes of seabird death in and around US military training areas in 
Alaska is attributed to WP.215 Birds such as ducks, swans and various wading birds confuse 
particles of phosphorus with food. Damaged and poisoned birds fall easily as prey to 
various predators such as eagles, hawks, foxes, and raccoons. There is further risk that WP 
as part of a food chain intoxicates other animals. As a consequence of the high birth 
mortality in that area, it is now prohibited to conduct military training with WP in the 
wetlands in the USA.216 
The effects of WP have also been tested on mammals, such as rats and dogs. WP is 
one among the most toxic inorganic substances where the lethal dose is found to be below 
1mg/kg of body weight.217 The rat that was injected with 0,05mg/kg of WP detected 
changes in bone tissue. Dogs that were subcutaneously exposed to WP with the dosage of 
0,2mg to 0,4mg/kg body weight died within days. A dog that was chronically exposed to 
WP with 0,1mg/kg per day developed permanent lever damage. The FOI study concluded 
that WP is toxic to highly toxic for mammals, birds, fish and crustaceans.218 WP is also 
classified as environmentally hazardous substance. FOI does not present any effects on 
humans but Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has stated that 
humans can be exposed to WP by breathing contaminated air, eating contaminated fish or 
game birds from sites containing WP and drinking or swimming in water that has been 
contaminated with WP.219 They further highlight that exposure to WP may cause the 
already mentioned burn and irritation of the skin but also liver, kidney, heart, lung, or bone 
damage and death. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has listed WP as a Hazardous 
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Air Pollutant and the agency requires reports when 1 pound or more of WP has been spilled 
or accidentally released into the environment. Swedish Chemical Agency 
(Kemikalieinspektionen) has classified WP as environmentally hazardous substance.220 
 
7.2 Legal aspects of the environmental damage allegedly caused by WP toxicity 
 
The damage or injury caused to the environment from WP may be caused by its incendiary 
effect or/and its toxic characteristics. When burn injury is created, WP can easily enter the 
blood system and intoxicate persons and animals. According to the CWC Art II (2) a toxic 
chemical includes those chemicals that cause death or permanent harm to humans or 
animals (my emphasis). This may suggest that some account is also given to animals, a part 
from humans. However, the usage of WP in times of armed conflict seems not to be 
primarily for its toxic abilities, which makes its inclusion in CWC somewhat uncertain. 
Nevertheless, its toxic abilities will effect the environment whatever the primary purpose 
for its original usage might be. When WP enters the soil and water, it affects the living 
organisms negatively. The effects may spread to other living organisms and also affect 
people where such living organisms are included in the human food chain. Where the WP 
has entered drinking water system, it may spread to neighboring surroundings and affect 
other parts of the population than just those directly affected by the attacks. 
It is interesting how, on the national level (at least for Sweden, USA and UK), certain 
documented qualification of WP are both thorough and the usage is monitored.221 
However, the hazardous impact on the environment where WP has been released seems to 
be completely ignored in times of armed conflict. This is even more interesting since there 
is no doubt that WP continues to be present in the area even after the armed conflict has 
ended, especially if it enters the water whose chemical formula keeps it intact for longer 
period of time than when exposed to oxygen. With its continuing presence it poses 
imminent risk to the environmental surroundings and humans. There are some 
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uncertainties, though, on how much WP needs to be released into the environment in order 
to make an overall negative impact on the ecosystems. As FOI suggests for Sweden, the 
presence of WP in the environment need to be put in relation to the number of fired shells 
and remaining duds. This assessment would require thorough scientific investigations in 
post war territories.  Nevertheless, in Fallujah, where the health of population has been 
deteriorating for the last decade, such investigation, in my opinion, may be of significant 
importance. Scientific uncertainties should not be used as an excuse to continue using an 
environmentally hazardous substance and pollutant. The meaning of protection and 
preservation of the environment require that the precautions be taken when deploying 
weapons containing WP. As Wexler pointed out earlier, the liability of the damage caused 
in such a case falls on the polluter. This is also in accordance with the principle of 
international law stated in ICIJ, Chorzów Factory Case222 and repeated in the Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.223 
The two national reports about the effects of WP on the environment that I have 
addressed, present the possibility to further demand higher precautions when deploying 
weapons containing WP, based on the suggestions of the reports. In every case, 
environment needs to be included in the assessment of excessiveness when WP is chosen 
as a mean of warfare. The assessment of excessiveness needs to include the impacts of 
choice of means and methods deployed even after the battle has ended. Continuation of the 
usage of WP in different weapons and the assessment of excessiveness needs to be 
understood in the light of the planned decontamination and remediation work. If no 
decontamination is planned after the battle has ended, the impacts on the environment will 
be higher because the hazardous substance, such as WP, will inflict injury over longer 
period of time. If there is neither cleaning of the area planned nor the responsibility 
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demanded from those who deploy contaminating weapons, the proportionality test must be 
adapted to these circumstances. In such case the threshold for the damage expected needs 
to be lower when counting disproportionate damage. Whether the use of WP in Fallujah 
was excessive is hard to establish, as there are no safe parameters to calculate the 
proportion of damage in relation to the military advantage anticipated. A comprehensive 
review of the environmental effects of WP in Fallujah needs to be undertaken in order to 
come closer to answering this question.
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8 Conclusions 
 
People cannot survive outside of a healthy environment. In spite of the fact that one can be 
of a view that environment merits protection per se even in times of war, IHL is only 
concerned with the anthropocentric basis of the environmental protection. Even though the 
environmental protection is somewhat recognized in times of armed conflicts, the 
provisions that directly protect the environment stated in AP I are not applicable in the case 
of Fallujah. The means and methods that were used in Fallujah have not inflicted the level 
of the damage that is required for the damage to be unlawful, according to the provisions of 
Art 35(3) and Art 55(1) of AP I. Serious damage, however, can still be inflicted without 
reaching the requirement of triple threshold presented in these two provisions.  
With this conclusion, the problem still remains that the environment, both per se and as 
part of civilian objects, together with civilians, is targeted in times of armed conflicts. 
Protection of the environment in times of armed conflicts does not fall outside the scope of 
IHL just because the Art 35 (3) and Art 55(1) are not directly applicable. The damage 
inflicted upon environment must still pass the military criteria for requirements and 
practicalities on the battlefield such as military necessity, military advantage and the 
proportionality test.  
In the case of Fallujah, the environment does not seem to have been directly targeted 
as a military objective. What was targeted are the belligerents located in the city. The 
military advantage anticipated from that attack constitutes the neutralization of the enemy 
under those particular circumstances presented under that specific time in Fallujah. It was a 
military necessity to neutralize the enemy in Fallujah. In order to neutralize the enemy, 
certain military objectives where chosen in the city. Following the attack on those military 
objectives, the collateral damage created was a near destruction of the city. Even though it 
is hard to establish whether such destruction was excessive to the military advantage 
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anticipated, it might be established that the US forces could in fact envisage that the attack 
launched would, in fact, provoke near destruction of the city. 
If one is of the opinion that the usage of incendiary weapons is not illegal even in 
urban areas if such means can be expected to create less collateral damage than any other 
means of warfare, such as the opinion (and argument for reservation to the CCW Protocol 
III) of the USA, then one can possibly come to a conclusion that the damage created is in 
proportion to the military advantage anticipated. However, if one is of the opinion, such as 
myself, that the usage of incendiary weapons in the way they were used in Fallujah, had an 
indiscriminate effect on the environment and population, and on the basis of the prohibition 
of this rule, are illegal, they cannot be considered in proportion to the military advantage 
anticipated. Indiscriminate attacks are always disproportionate and for that reason militarily 
unnecessary. Further more, the additional alleged usage of MK 77 creates indiscriminate 
effects on its own, regardless of other munitions containing WP. This is so because it is 
delivered by air and directly breaches the provisions of AP I. As customary international 
law, the principle is applicable whether or not the AP I has been signed. 
Nevertheless, other important damage assessment of this possible destruction may 
not be included. This being the possible long-term damages caused by the toxic effects of 
the means and methods chosen. Even if the conclusion may be that the chosen means and 
methods were not breaching any IHL provisions at the time when they were deployed, the 
long-term damages to the environment can mean that they in fact breach IHL provisions, 
should such long-term damages be included from the beginning. This seems to be an 
obvious problem with the environmental damage where the infliction can be immediate but 
also may appear for some time afterwards. Analyzing the case of Fallujah, the latter does 
not seem to have been included in the notion of collateral damage. Instead, the long-term 
risk posed to environment seems to have been completely ignored. If the long-term effects 
to the environment were calculated in the assessment of collateral damage, one could have 
come to a conclusion that the attack might perhaps be disproportionate on the basis of the 
conclusion of the long-term damage done to the environment. If the long-term effects to the 
environment do affect the health of the population for the generations to come, it is 
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obviously an aspect that needs to be included in the assessment of the collateral damage. In 
Fallujah, this does not seem to have been the case. 
The assessment of excessiveness of the damage is based on the damage or injury that 
is expected by the means and methods chosen, regardless of what the usage of WP 
weapons were primarily made for. The exclusion of WP from the CWC and CCW on the 
basis of their primary use does not extinguish the fact that they create secondary effect. 
Secondary effect, which, according to the scientific research available, may create 
devastating toxic effects on their own. Thus, the toxic abilities and their effects on the 
environment can be both excessive and/or military unnecessary. If this is the case in 
Fallujah, it needs to be examined on the basis of the effects that attack allegedly produced. 
In the end, it´s the sum of all means chosen containing WP that creates disproportionate 
attacks. The fact that the disproportion is already a fact on the basis of incendiary weapons 
containing WP and the deployment of MK 77 should not preclude the long-term effects the 
toxic abilities may have on the environment. 
The principles of IHL need to develop the definition of what constitutes an 
environmental damage that is closer to the definition offered by science. In such case, the 
damage may be avoided before it becomes irreversible and permanent. The lack of a clearer 
definition of environmental damage in the provisions of IHL may result in the lack of 
accountability and responsibility for the damage caused. Such damage, neither investigated 
nor decontaminated may affect negatively the social as well as economic stability as people 
are prevented to actively participate in the society due to the grave health issue they might 
face. Indeed, the scientific investigation in post-war areas may be necessary and needed 
step towards rebuilding peace and security in such places, an equation that includes a 
healthy and protected environment. 
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